CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

MILAN LIPOVSKÝ CYIL 14 (2023) the Monetary Gold principle. Because the principle was developed as a result of the system of the SICJ, finding an exception to it must also be done via interpretation of the SICJ (and other statues of judicial bodies). Thus, to ask the question, whether the intervention in proceedings is an exception to the Monetary Gold principle, is the same as to ask whether the intervention is a way of safeguarding the reasons that lead the ICJ to establish the principle. 4. Source of the Monetary Gold principle – consent of the parties, res iudicata interplay with quasi-precedential value of a judgment even for third parties, or due process? The Statute of the ICJ does not explicitly contain the Monetary Gold principle. Nor do the rules contained in statutes of many other judicial (and quasi-judicial) mechanisms. To identify the roots of the principle, it is necessary to generalize the attitude of the judicial bodies that referred to it because the ICJ itself (and other bodies as well) has been rather vague in reasoning of the principle. 59 By this generalisation of the analysis contained above, primarily three main reasons (to large extent interconnected) have been identified repeatedly and they include the following: the consensual nature of the exercise of the jurisdiction, the res iudicata interplaying with quasi-precedential value of the judgments and thirdly the right to be heard of the party influenced by possible judgment (see all mentioned above). The consensual nature of exercise of jurisdiction has been dealt with extensively already. 60 The ICJ referred to the consensual nature of exercise of its jurisdiction as the source of the principle from the very beginning. The res iudicata interplaying with the quasi-precedential nature of judgments needs further explanation though. If using the example of the ICJ, its Statute provides that binding effects of its judgments in contentious proceedings are limited to the parties of the disputes. 61 It would seem that third parties are protected. And indeed they are, but only against the obvious consequences – the binding effects of judgments. Facing the nature of the effects of such judgments, it would be naïve however to consider that to be the end of the story for third states. Clearly, the ICJ judgments have more than “no effects” on other states than parties to the proceedings that such judgments were issued within. The point is also highlighted in the rationale behind the following statement: Although there is no doctrine of binding precedent in international law, it is only in the most compelling circumstances that a tribunal charged with the application of international law and governed by that law should depart from a principle laid down in a long line of decisions of the International Court of Justice . 62 Consequently, even if the affected third state is protected from the obvious effects of a judgment in proceedings that it was not a party to, there are other effects that may implicate consequences for such third state. And those are exactly the reasons that have driven the ICJ 59 THIENEL, T., ‘Third States and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: The Monetary Gold Principle’, in 57 German Yearbook of International Law (2014), p. 329. 60 Additionally see, among others, recent award in PCA, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom , 1999-01, Award (5 February 2001), paras. 11.20. 61 Art. 59 SICJ: “ The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. ” 62 PCA, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom , 1999-01, Award (5 February 2001), paras. 11.21.

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