CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

MILAN LIPOVSKÝ CYIL 14 (2023) the author of this article would not go that far as to counter-balance the principle and Art. 62 SICJ, he agrees with the authors of the referred article that the right to intervene should be used by the ICJ much more liberally 65 because it would balance the negative effects of the Monetary Gold principle. The fact that the right to intervene, when allowed by the ICJ, balances the fears that lead to formulating the Monetary Gold principle, is most visible in the right to be heard. Its role (in relation to the Monetary Gold principle) is in safeguarding the right to present one’s opinions in proceedings that affect the party. Successful intervention into proceedings allows that fully. As a result, even the consequences of such proceedings (a possible judgment/award) will be influenced by the opinions brought by the relevant third state(s). The very same conclusion of safeguarding the third state’s interests applies to the res iudicata and quasi-precedential value interplay root of the Monetary Gold principle. The principle does not protect parties from having to face consequences of their (illegal) activities, including assessment by other entities. Rather, the courts have worked with it as a tool to guarantee even the third states’ capability to be able to influence the assessment. That can be perfectly achieved through the right to intervene in the proceedings that it would otherwise not be a party to. The problem remains in the consensual nature of exercise of jurisdiction (and one might add, it remains in the consensual nature of facing the consequences of the courts exercising their jurisdiction), however. If the third state seeks the intervention and indeed succeeds in it, it may very well be argued that it expresses its will to participate and accept the consequences of the proceedings. But what if the third state does not seek the right to intervene? It must be admitted, that in this regard, the argumentation is purely theoretical, yet it is in compliance with the nature of the reasons for safeguarding legal interests of the third parties. As the principle evolved from the systematics of the Statute of the ICJ under certain circumstances existing at that time (mid-20 th century), the author of this article suggests to interpret it in light of current international relations now. Voluntary refusal to petition for the right to intervene in a matter of legal interests of the third state should be understood as implicit acceptance of the possible results. Such a conclusion is admittedly not based upon the explicit rules of written law, but actually, neither is the Monetary Gold principle itself. The opinion is based upon the realities of the world, those that Judge Cancado Trindade mentioned, as well as increasing interconnectedness of the world and the need to interpret law accordingly. Many judicial bodies interpret their applicable law in evolutive way based on the progress of the international community, there is no reason why procedural law should not be interpreted so either. All the more so because the peaceful settlement of disputes is a peremptory obligation that could be seriously hampered by strict application of the Monetary Gold principle (not containing the exception in it through the right to seek intervention in the proceedings concerning own legal interests and forming the very subject-matter of it). Although not talking about this exact issue, Judge Weeramantry also pointed out the need of interpretation of the Monetary Gold principle in a way that would not lead to absurd results, such as blocking of the Court’s function – to settle disputes, when he stated that: The conclusion is compelling that an interpretation of Monetary Gold to produce such a result clearly extends the decision far beyond its permissible limits. Indeed, such an

65 And thus, change its attitude because historically, it has not allowed the intervention often – CRAWFORD, J., Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law . 8 th ed., Oxford: OUP, 2012, p. 698.

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