CYIL vol. 15 (2024)

JAKUB HANDRLICA development would allow to face a strong international industrial competition in the sector (cf. USA, the United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Japan and Korea). 22 Further, the Declaration recognised that nuclear, and particularly SMRs, can play an essential role beyond electricity production in, for example, decarbonising hard-to-abate sectors. In this respect, the Declaration also highlights that several states of Europe have recently committed significant funds to research, development, and innovation on SMRs. This is the case for Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Slovenia. 23 At the same time, the Declaration emphasises the central role of Euratom in the future development of these advanced nuclear technologies. In this respect, the Declaration announces that beyond electricity production, SMRs also have considerable potential in other applications, such as cogeneration for energy-intensive industries, district heating and desalination, and in support of hydrogen production to decarbonise the industrial, residential, and transport sectors. 24 The fact is, however, that despite a comprehensive discussion on lunar nuclear endeavours that is to be found in technological literature nowadays, the Declaration remains silent concerning the prospective role of Euratom. One can understand this standpoint, as several arguments may be identified against any current involvement of Euratom in these endeavours. These are as follows: a) Absence of competence While the European Union can rely on an explicit legal base for its space programme, 25 the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) 26 lacks any similar provision. This grave difference between the texts of the founding Treaties is understandable. While the text of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union was adopted in the midst of the New Space Era, the wording of the Euratom Treaty still reflects the reality of the late 1950s, when the nuclear industry was in the state of its infancy. 27 T he fact is, however, that the absence of an explicit competence for space exploration in the text of the Euratom Treaty cannot be per se interpreted as such competence is not present. The Euratom Treaty was adopted ‘to create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive energy resources, lead to the modernisation of technical processes and contribute, through its many other applications, to the prosperity of their peoples’. 28 In this respect, the Treaty stresses that the main task of Euratom has been ‘creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth

22 See ‘Declaration’, Article 3). 23 See ‘Declaration’, Article 4). 24 Ibid.

25 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 189. In this respect, however, concerns have been expressed regarding the newest legislative initiatives by the European Commission, see for example See BENNET, C.‘A future ‘EU Space Law’: A few Constitutional Considerations’ (8 August 2023, EJIL : Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law ), available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-future-eu-space-law-a-few constitutional-considerations/. 26 Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ C 203, 7. 6. 2016, at pp. 1–112. 27 See HANDRLICA, J. ‘The Splendid Durability of the Provisional: A Tribute to Euratom’ (2018) 14 CYELP 161. 28 Euratom Treaty, Preamble.

234