CYIL vol. 15 (2024)

EZEKIEL ARCHIBONG on the sea, they can rely on the abundance of seawater for cooling needs without the additional infrastructure or water procurement usually required by land-based nuclear plants. 36 3. African Regulatory Context: The Pelindaba Treaty The African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty ( Pelindaba Treaty ) and its protocol serve as the regional instruments on nuclear activities in Africa. 37 The primary objective of the Treaty is to establish Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and bolster the non-proliferation regime. 38 Furthermore, the Treaty provides for the practical application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including electricity generation. 39 Under Article 1, a “nuclear installation” comprehensively includes nuclear power reactors, research reactors, critical facilities, conversion plants, fabrication plants, reprocessing plants, isotope separation plants, separate storage installations, and any other locations where fresh or irradiated nuclear material or significant quantities of radioactive materials are present. This broad definition arguably encompasses FNPPs. However, the Pelindaba Treaty provisions are merely peripheral and do not adequately provide nuclear safety, safeguards, and security. Instead, it provides that the safeguards should adhere to the Agreements concluded by the IAEA. 40 It also mandates each Party to maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical protection to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling. 41 To achieve this, Parties are required to utilize assistance programs available through the IAEA 42 and implement physical protection measures outlined in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and in IAEA recommendations and guidelines. 43 In that vein, the following chapter will extensively discuss the legal issues arising from the deployment of FNPPs in Africa from the point of view of safeguards, safety, and security within the international regulatory framework, particularly the IAEA. Safeguards The Safeguards of FNPP do not pose a lot of issues. According to a 2013 IAEA Report, no distinct characteristics in the construction or operation of transportable nuclear plants differentiate them from non-transportable power plants. However, when an FNPP is built in a nuclear weapons state and exported to a non-nuclear weapon state, cooperation with the IAEA for design information verification will be required. 44 This is even more so as all West African countries are newcomers to nuclear energy. The IAEA Study also recommends 36 World Economic Forum, ‘Could we build nuclear power plants that float on the sea?’ ( World Economic Forum , 26 June 2015) accessed 5 May 2024. 37 African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) 1997. 38 See the Introductory section of the Pelindaba Treaty. 39 See the Introductory section; Article 8 of the Pelindaba Treaty. 40 Article 9; Annex II. 41 Article 10 Pelindaba Treaty. 42 Article 8(3) Pelindaba Treaty. 43 Article 10 Pelindaba Treaty. 44 International Atomic Energy Agency, Legal and Institutional Issues of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants: A Preliminary Study (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2013). 4. International Regulatory Context

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