CYIL vol. 15 (2024)

EZEKIEL ARCHIBONG than rigid international safety rules or procedures on nuclear. This provision unambiguously underscores that safety guidelines, like all technical documents, can be subject to periodic updates to incorporate emerging technologies and address contemporary issues. The Preamble, specifically in paragraph (x), also conveys the drafters’ intent not to confine the scope of the CNS solely to the matters specified in Article 3 and defined in Article 2(i). Instead, it signifies a willingness to consider the development of future instruments. 52 In the 2013 Report, the IAEA observed that the CNS and other instruments, including the IAEA safety standards, should apply to TNPP, of which FNPPs are subsumed. The report highlighted that the safety spirit of existing norms, rather than their precise provisions, should serve as the substantive foundation of FNPP regulation. However, the IAEA recognized that FNPPs, which share characteristics with both land-based nuclear power plants and nuclear powered vessels, are inherently unique and may represent a novel category requiring the development of specific nuclear safety norms, standards, and best practices. It noted that existing instruments may not comprehensively address specific scenarios of FNPP deployment, such as the transport of factory-fabricated, fuelled, tested, and “operable” reactors. 53 Should FNPPs be classified as nuclear installations, the practical mechanisms in the event of a nuclear accident, provided under the Early Notification and the Assistance Conventions, are most likely generally applicable to FNPPs. Another significant fallout with the CNS is that its scope is limited to the safety of nuclear power plants without addressing the safety of radioactive waste and spent fuel management. The Joint Convention has however filled this lacuna. Article 3 of the Joint Convention provides its scope to include spent fuel resulting from civilian nuclear activities and radioactive waste management. 54 Just like the CNS, the Joint Convention excludes fuel from military programs. Furthermore, the definitions of some terms, such as “radioactive waste management” and “radioactive waste management facility,” cover only relevant “primary purpose” facilities and rule out off-site transportation. 55 Another issue related to the Joint Convention is that it does not cover FNPP scenarios involving the integration of storage facilities intended to accommodate both fresh and spent fuel assemblies. Fresh fuel is typically loaded into the FNPP at the beginning of its operation. As the reactor functions, spent fuel accumulates until it reaches the end of its operational lifespan, at which point it is towed back for refuelling. In the case of Akademik Lomonosov, refuelling or defuelling operations occur only once every 12 years, thereby reducing potential risks and costly maritime supply routes, which is common with nuclear-powered icebreakers. When the host state transports the reactor back to the supplier for maintenance or decommissioning, the Joint Convention may likely apply if the spent fuel is transported separately from the reactor. Transporting a reactor alongside spent fuel is a novel scenario that may necessitate a new legal framework to ensure safety. 56 52 Ibid. 53 International Atomic Energy Agency, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540/Corrected, IAEA, Vienna, 1997. 54 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 1997, paras 1–2. 55 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 1997, Art. 2(i) and (j) and (r). 56 FIALKOFF, M. R. ‘The Floating Chameleon: Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Nexus of Maritime and Nuclear Security Law’ (2020) 51 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 131.

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