CYIL vol. 16 (2025)

CYIL 16 (2025) BETWEEN INNOVATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT: EXPLORING NUCLEAR LIABILITY … and operation. This fragmentation of roles raises critical questions about whether it remains appropriate to assign full liability solely to the operator, especially in circumstances where the operator may have no real influence over the design or construction of the reactor. At the same time, it can be argued that the principle of strict liability should not be weakened simply because SMRs are perceived as safer. Liability must remain focused on consequences rather than probabilities. If an incident occurs, its cause is secondary to the need for effective victim compensation and public accountability. Hence, while SMRs are widely regarded as safer than traditional nuclear installations, the authors believe that this enhanced safety profile cannot justify exempting them from strict liability. The key function of strict liability is not to assess how likely an incident is to happen, but to ensure that when harm does occur, victims are compensated quickly and fairly. Once damage has occurred, the statistical rarity of the event becomes irrelevant. Even low-risk technologies can produce catastrophic consequences, and the legal system must be structured to respond to those consequences regardless of fault. Relaxing strict liability on the basis of reduced risk would blur the line between risk and accountability and potentially undermine the very purpose of the liability framework to provide clear, predictable, and enforceable protection for the public in the face of high-consequence technologies. While the authors believe that strict liability should be preserved, other elements of the liability regime, particularly financial security requirements, may warrant closer scrutiny. SMRs, especially very small or low-power variants, are likely to cause less damage in absolute terms than conventional reactors. This must be balanced against the fact that SMRs may be deployed closer to population centers, where even minor incidents could have disproportionate social and economic consequences. These trade-offs suggest that a risk-informed, differentiated approach may be more appropriate than the current uniform model. Importantly, such an approach requires robust empirical data on reactor design, deployment scenarios, population exposure, and operational reliability, to tailor liability and insurance standards to real-world risk. In this context, the recent Czech legislative amendment implemented by Act No. 83/2025 Sb. offers an example of a more flexible regulatory strategy. By introducing a mechanism for granting ad hoc exceptions to certain legal requirements, under strict conditions and with continued oversight, the Czech model provides a possible blueprint for aligning regulation with innovation without undermining core safety principles. It illustrates that legal frameworks can be both adaptive and protective, i.e., capable of responding to emerging technologies while still safeguarding the public interest. Equally, the authors believe that the role of insurers will become increasingly important. How insurance providers assess SMR risks, structure coverage, and adjust premiums will influence both the viability of SMR projects and the adequacy of victim compensation in the event of damage. The insurance market may act as a bellwether of regulatory sufficiency, and its response to SMRs deserves careful attention from both policymakers and regulators. In conclusion, this article argues for a balanced and forward-looking approach: one that preserves essential legal protections such as strict liability, while allowing greater flexibility in how financial and regulatory burdens are distributed across actors and installations. As SMRs continue to move from the drawing board to deployment, the legal framework must evolve in step, guided by the principles of fairness, technological realism, and public trust. This article is, of course, merely the first step towards a complex policy recommendation

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