CYIL Vol. 7, 2016

DALIBOR JÍLEK – JANA MICHALIČKOVÁ CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ the change of an individual’s place of living. The alteration of domicile, nonetheless, must have been voluntary, based on a free-will decision. There is nothing to prevent anyone from having his domicile wherever he wishes, for the reason that he is not forbidden to do so. 15 In relation to the above mentioned, Ulpianus Digesta referred to a diverse concept of domicile which was characterised by not only a legal but descriptive content as well. Its conceptual role was more efficient. The concept acquired some attributes of an abstract legal construct: Domicilium re et facto transfertur, non nuda contestatione. The change of domicil is shown by facts and actions, not by mere words. 16 This concept integrated facto and nuda contestatio into the conceptual structure. The concept presupposed an objective and subjective conceptual component: factum et animus . A mere manifestation of will was not sufficient. A permanent settlement, as opposed to a transient settlement, was distinguished by contention. The person must have declared, by noticeable action, a firm intent to reside in the place determined by his choice. Animus must have corresponded, among other things, to a personal state of mind. Factum assumed entire integration into an urban community, into its social and religious life. 17 Factum represented the real belongings of an individual and his integration into the social life of the community. Domicile must have resulted in the permanent home of a person and eventually his family, so as to constitute the centre of his affairs. A temporary dweller lacks both of the aspects mentioned. A domicile was appended by the second conceptual component, i.e contestatio : a declaration or verbalisation of will. Apparently, such contention was required by law in the Republican era with reference to the introduction of local census. Domicile and origo were two grounds of connection with a particular urban community. The conceptual role of domicile as well as origo must have been sufficiently effective. Domicilium and origo were two forms of the legal bond to the urban community. The citizen himself and other members of the urban community as well were subject to the same jurisdiction and law. Whereas origo , as a legal relationship, embodied reciprocal rights and obligations, no rights were governed expressly by the domicile. An individual benefited from advantages and enjoyments resulting from the factual consequences of his domicile. Simultaneously, the rights could have been established by the mere will of an individual. 18

15 Ibid . 16 D.50. I.20. Paul. 17 MOATTI, Claudia, op. cit. , p. 136. 18 SAVIGNY, Friedrich Carl, op. cit. , p. 65.

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