CYIL Vol. 7, 2016

ONDŘEJ SVAČEK CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ However, there is much uncertainty about the meaning and legal source of these powers. Starting from terminology, inherent and implied powers are sometimes used as equivalent notions, while sometimes they have been given different meanings. 36 It is argued that the notion of implied powers may be used only with regard to unexpressed powers of international organizations, while inherent powers attach to international judicial bodies. 37 Nevertheless, this approach overlooks the fact that certain international tribunals (e.g. the ICC) have the status of international organizations disposing with an independent and autonomous legal personality. This means that the doctrine of implied powers is fully applicable even towards this type of international criminal tribunal. As contended by F. Martines, inherent powers refer to powers enabling an entity to manifest its status as a legal person and powers this entity exercises qua judicial body; they stem from the very existence of the entity. 38 On the other side, implied powers are usually described as powers that are necessary for the achievement of the purposes of the organization/entity (broad approach), or for the effective exercise of the competences expressly granted to it (narrow approach). 39 Without further analysis it is enough to say here that ‘the distinction between […] inherent powers […], on one side, and implicit powers, on the other side, has become blurred and the separation between these concepts remains unsettled.’ 40 According to N. Blokker, the approach distinguishing inherent and implicit powers ‘has not found much support, perhaps because it could not convincingly be demonstrated how the notion of inherent powers could draw a clearer, more objective line than that of implied powers between what is inherent – or implied – and what is not.’ 41 Disputes nevertheless do not end up here. If the argument that there is a certain distinction between implied and inherent powers is finally accepted, there is no consensus on how far these doctrines are applicable with respect to the ICC. The point of departure here is Article 4 of the ICC Statute. 42 Some scholars argue that 36 GAETA, Paola. Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals. In: Men’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law on Honour of Antonio Cassese . The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 362. 37 Ibid . This distinction is supported by the case-law of the ICTY, cf . Blaškić, IT-95-14, ACH, 29 October 1997, § 25, footnote 27. 38 MARTINES, Francesca. Legal Status and Powers of the Court. In: CASSESE, Antonio et al. (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . Vol. 1. Oxford: OUP, pp. 215-218. 39 RÜCKERT, Wiebke. Legal status and powers of the court. In: TRIFTERRER, Otto . Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article . 2 nd edition. München: Beck/Hart, 2008, p. 126. 40 PIERINI, Jean Paul. The inflated invocation of inherent jurisdiction and powers by international and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals between gap filling and erosion of core values. Online Working Paper . Università di Catania, 2015, no. 75, p. 5. Available online at: http://www.cde.unict.it/ sites/default/files/Quaderno%20europeo_75_2015.pdf [06/28/2016]. 41 Blokker, N.: supra , p. 19. 42 Article 4 provides: Legal status and powers of the Court 1. The Court shall have international legal

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