CYIL vol. 8 (2017)

CYIL 8 ȍ2017Ȏ THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION … of representation and parliamentarism (input democracy), and helps to legitimize activities of the Union. 7 Finally, yet importantly, the Charter brought (or, better said, codified) the kind of new federal impetus 8 into the EU system and opened the discussions about more ‘bounding’ tendencies within the integration project. 9 The supranational catalogue of fundamental rights reaches the spheres of the Member States as they are included in the list of “negative” addressees, thus standing as those entities obliged to respect the Charter. The Charter, as the catalogue of the “centre”, binds the several parts of the Union (states) and attributes one standard over the entire community. A very important provision which has to be mentioned in connection with these federal impacts is Article 51(1) of the Charter. It defines the addressees of obligation to respect the rights included in the Charter. There are two categories of addressees which have an obligation to respect the Charter. Firstly and in general it is about the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. Here the Charter serves as the tool for strengthening the rule of law and the democratic legitimacy of supranational governance. It is the goal of a long path on which the Communities and Union were seeking the ideal tool for the protection of fundamental rights. Institutions of the EU are responsible for respecting rights protected by the Charter generally in all activities that could touch upon individuals’ rights. The second category of addressees is represented by the Member States. Here the Charter again brings the federalisation question onto the scene. The question of the existence of a common (central) standard of fundamental rights protection binding upon all Member States (peripheries) is clearly interconnected with the emancipation and dominance of EU law. 10 And it deepens the scope of protection of individuals within the whole system of application of EU law. But it is worth mentioning here that not all Member States’ conduct falls under the Charter conformity test. It is clear from the wording of article 51(1) that the Charter is applicable vis-à-vis Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. The Charter (unlike for example the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) is not universally applicable. Its applicability occurs, roughly speaking, where the conduct of a Member State has some EU dimension. The question is not whether the Member States must fulfil the Charter but to what extent they must do that. The abovementioned limitation is the clear outcome of the cautious and doubting approach of some Member States (especially the United Kingdom) 11 to the gradual widening of applicability of Union fundamental rights standards to the actions of 7 LENAERTS, K., CAMBIEN, N., The democratic legitimacy of the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon. In Wouters, J. (Ed.), European constitutionalism beyond Lisbon , Intersentia, 2008, pp. 185-207. 8 Not immune from the critics. See DI FABIO, U., A European Charter: Towards a Constitution for the Union. Columbia Journal of European Law , 2001, vol. 7, pp. 159-172. 9 EECKHOUT, P., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question. Common Market Law Review , 2002, vol. 39, pp. 945-994; KNOOK, A., The Court, the Charter, and the vertical division of powers in the European Union. Common Market Law Review , 2005, vol. 41, pp. 367-398; HAMUĽÁK, O., National Sovereignty in the European Union -View from the Czech Perspective , Springer, 2016; SPAVENTA, E., Federalisation versus Centralisation: tensions in fundamental rights discourse in the EU. In Currie, S.; Dougan, M., 50 years of the European Treaties: Looking backwards Thinking Forward , Hart publishing, 2009, p. 343. 10 HAMUĽÁK, O., National Sovereignty in the European Union -View from the Czech Perspective , Springer, 2016. 11 BELLING, V., Supranational Fundamental Rights or Primacy of Sovereignty? Legal Effects of the So-Called Opt-Out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. European Law Journal, 2012, vol. 18, pp. 251-268.

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