CYIL vol. 8 (2017)

VERONIKA BÍLKOVÁ CYIL 8 ȍ2017Ȏ attack from other less grave forms, such as mere frontier incidents, which do not trigger the right to self-defence. 106 In its interpretation of the concept of armed attack, the ICJ relied on the UN General Assembly resolution 3314 (1974) on the Definition of Aggression. 107 The resolution gives a demonstrative list of acts which should qualify as acts of aggression. All these acts – including invasion by armed forces, bombardment, or blockade of the ports – presuppose a certain level of gravity. Over the past decades, an increasing number of scholars have argued that terrorist acts, if they reach this level of gravity, could also qualify as armed attacks. 108 A canonical example would be the attacks of 11 September 2001. The scale, the death toll and the severity of the repercussions made these attacks very similar to a traditional armed invasion – and so were they perceived both by the US as the victim State and by the international community. 109 It is more disputable whether lower scale, isolated terrorist acts such as those recently recorded in France or the UK, can constitute an armed attack. So called “accumulation of events theory” has been propounded by certain States, primarily Israel. 110 Under this theory, a series of attacks which are “linked in time, source and cause”, 111 may reach the threshold of an armed attack and trigger the right to self-defence, as long as there is evidence suggesting that the attacks are likely to continue. Although the theory seems to receive growing support at the international scene, 112 it is still not uniformly accepted. Whether one embraces it or not may, however, have serious implications for the assessment of some of the self-defence claims quoted above. There can be little doubt that the two countries on whose territory the IS operates, Iraq and Syria, have been exposed to a high level of violence by the IS which, by its intensity, could amount to an armed attack. They can also request military assistance from outside. Other countries relying on individual self-defence – the US, the UK and, arguably, Turkey and France – have, however, a weaker case. The latter two have had terrorist attacks committed on their territory. Yet, these attacks have been isolated and their attribution to the IS is not obvious. As long as the link between the attacks and the IS is not well-established and the accumulation of events theory does not secure larger support, the appeal to the right to individual self-defence with respect to terrorist acts might fail to persuade the international community. As we already saw above, Turkey itself is probably not fully persuaded either, as during the debates in the UN, it relied on intervention by invitation rather than on self- defence (section 4). The argument put forward by the US and the UK is also problematic. Referring to “planning and directing imminent armed attacks” 113 and to the threat the IS poses “not only to Iraq, but also to many other countries” , 114 the two countries seem to make a claim 106 Ibidem, par. 191 and 195. 107 UN Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, 14 December 1974. 108 See MURPHY, Sean D., Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter , Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002, pp. 41-51. 109 Ibidem. 110 See RONEN, Yael, Israel, Hizbollah and the Second Lebanon War, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 9, 2006, pp. 362-393. 111 RUYS, Tom, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter. Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 168. 112 Ibidem, pp. 168-175.

113 UN Doc. S/2015/688, op. cit. 114 UN Doc. S/2014/695, op. cit.

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