CYIL vol. 8 (2017)

MARTIN ŠOLC CYIL 8 ȍ2017Ȏ The ECtHR has two intermingled basic roles, which are application and interpretation of the Convention. The importance of the interpretative function is highlighted by the fact that the ECtHR usually adheres to its former decisions. However, this almost precedential system does not support a petrification of once expressed judges’ opinions. That is due to the doctrine of evolutive interpretation of the Convention. The ECtHR in its judgment of 25 April 1978, Application no. 5856/72, Tyrer v. The United Kingdom , famously stated that “the Convention is a living instrument which (…) must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions” . On this doctrine’s basis, the ECtHR has derived several entirely new rights from the text of the Convention. An example of this development is the right to access to assisted reproductive technology derived from the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8. 44 In order to assure its decisions are both up to date with the present conditions, on the one hand, and predictable and consistent, on the other hand, the ECtHR adapts its decision- making to the European consensus. The ECtHR’s approach to a certain topic can be changed, even overturned, if it corresponds to the changing consensus among the States Parties. 45 If the text of the Convention is not clear and there is no European consensus concerning the question, the ECtHR grants the States Parties the margin of appreciation , which means there is a relatively wide space for the decision made by a particular national authority. 46 The ECtHR repeatedly states that a European consensus has not yet been reached in the question of the beginning of human life. 47 The lack of a European consensus regarding this problem is double: the views on the beginning of human life considerably diverge both among the States and within the States. 48 For these reasons, the ECtHR grants the States a wide margin of appreciation. 49 We should note here and below that the ECtHR works with the term “beginning of human life” . This could suggest that the ECtHR equates human life with a human person. However, nothing seems to support this interpretation. The ECtHR simply does not dive into the philosophical debate concerning ontological personalism and empirical functionalism. It rather uses the term in order to evade a need for a difficult and arbitrary differentiation of moral status of a human being that is not yet a person, on the one hand, and to evade an acceptance of ontological personalism, on the other hand. settlement, and refer some cases to the ECtHR. See International Justice Resource Center. European Court of Human Rights. accessed 7 April 2017. 44 See DOLEŽAL, Tomáš, Právo na heterologní IVF jako součást ochrany práva na respektování rodinného a soukromého života podle čl. 8 Evropské úmluvy o lidských právech? Časopis zdravotnického práva a bioetiky. (2012, Vol. 2, No. 2), p. 32. accessed 7 April 2017. 45 See DZEHTSIAROU, Kanstantsin, European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. German Law Journal. (2011, Vol. 12), p. 1730-1745, 2012, (Vol. 2, No. 2), p. 32. accessed 7 April 2017. 46 See Council of Europe. The Margin of Appreciation. accessed 7 April 2017. 47 BOUKOVÁ, Pavla, Na okrajích stránek Evropské úmluvy: Uvážení a konsensus států v současné judikatuře Evropského soudu pro lidská práva. Jurisprudence. (2012, No. 1), p. 3. 48 KMEC, Jiří, KOSAŘ, David, KRATOCHVÍL, Jan, BOBEK, Michal, Evropská úmluva o lidských právech. Komentář. 1 st edition. C. H. Beck, Praha 2012, p. 388-389. 49 BOUKOVÁ, Pavla. Na okrajích stránek Evropské úmluvy: Uvážení a konsensus států v současné judikatuře Evropského soudu pro lidská práva. Jurisprudence. (2012, No. 1), p. 3.

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