CYIL vol. 8 (2017)

KRISTÝNA URBANOVÁ CYIL 8 ȍ2017Ȏ However, the WTO law also recognizes several exceptions to the principal of non- discrimination embodied in MFN rule which enables preferential treatment to only some of the WTO members. These exceptions include special treatment of developing countries or, and more importantly in the context of the EU, establishment of free trade agreements or custom union between some countries. 12 In addition, the WTO recognizes two types of rights and obligations. The first group of them applies to all WTO members (e.g. the MFN rule), but the second group of rights and obligations are represented by country-specific commitments (e.g. a maximum level of tariff which the country can lawfully impose on foreign goods), called schedules of concessions (“schedules”). 13 What represents a key challenge for the UK government is the fact that the UK as a EU member currently does not have its own individualized schedules of concessions, because the EU has submitted overall schedules for all its members; once the UK leaves the EU it will thus be required to separate its schedules from the EU bundle. 14 The focus of this paper With regard to this arrangement of “tied” schedules, the aim of this paper is to provide a short analysis of the four following questions: (i) Shall the UK remain a WTO member after Brexit or will it be required to renegotiate its accession to the organisation? (ii) Does the UK, now as a current EU member have its own schedules? (iii) If it does, how we can identify these schedules; i.e. how can we separate them from the EU bundle? (iv) What can be the best process of separation of the schedules from the EU overall schedule to the UK’s country specific schedules? The UK’s membership in the WTO The first key question is whether the UK shall remain a member of the WTO or whether it will have to renegotiate its accession to the organisation. The debate over membership was accelerated by a statement of Charles Grant (a director of the Centre for European Reform), who in late July of 2016 opened the topic with a claim that the UK was a WTO member “via the EU”. 15 According this view, once the UK leaves the EU, it will be in need of acquiring full membership in the WTO. The process of accession would represent quite a challenge for the UK’s government, since according to the Agreement establishing the WTO (the “WTO Agreement”) accession requires approval of a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO. 16 Some other commentators opined that the UK’s membership in the WTO after leaving the EU is not automatic, but conditional on certification of its schedules. 17 That would equally 12 ORTINO, Federico, BARTELS, Lorand (eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System , Oxford University Press. 13 BARTELS, Lorand, The UK status of the WTO after Brexit , 23 September 2016, p. 6.Available at: https://www. peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/407396411.pdf. 14 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 5 th report of session 2016-17, supra note 6. 15 GRANT, Charles Theresa May and her six pack of difficult deals , Centre for European Reform, 28 July 2016 Available at: https://www.cer.org.uk/insights/theresa-may-and-her-six-pack-difficult-deals. 16 Article XII of the WTO Agreement. 17 FERNEKESS, Katrin, PALEVIČIENĖ, Solveiga, THADIKKARAN, Manu, The Future of The United Kingdom 3. 4.

498