CYIL vol. 8 (2017)

CYIL 8 ȍ2017Ȏ WTO IN CONTEXT OF BREXIT the EU. Since the EU’s 87 TRQs represent one of the largest quantity of TRQs among all WTO members, it is obvious that there is a lot at stake for traders in international business. 61 However, an alternative approach has been proposed by Lorand Bartels (again), who argues that there is no need for the UK to renegotiate its schedules. 62 His argument is based on the distinction between “modifications” and “rectification” of the schedules as differentiated in the 1980 Decision on Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions, which provides the rules for making changes to GATT 1994. 63 The rectification of schedules does not alter the scope of the concession, hence such changes of such schedules are made by a mere certification, which does not require consultations with other parties to the WTO. 64 The other WTO parties could prevent the certification by raising challenges to schedules within a period of three months, but it is important to bear in mind that non-certification does not represent an automatic violation of the WTO law. 65 Because the distinction between rectification and modification is based on whether the schedule is changed in a substantive way (modification) or whether the change does not alter the scope of the concession (rectification), it is agreed here that from the pure law point of view, rectification should suffice. This conclusion is a logical consequence of the previous findings, namely that the UK as a WTO member has even now its own rights and obligations, though these rights are closely tied with other EU members (see part 4 and 5 of this paper). Therefore, it is accordingly agreed that from the legal point of view a mere identification of the UK’s rights and obligations in the EU bundle and their separation from the bundle should not be treated as a substantive change of the schedule, which would require modification process. However, in practice the success of this method will depend on the fact of whether other WTO parties were to agree that the UK only separated its commitments from the current EU schedule or not. Contrary to the opinion presented here, some WTO members may believe that the UK changed schedules exceed the scope of mere rectification and should therefore be negotiated. In practice the UK could help its position of claiming “non-substantive change” if the proposed country specific schedules would not put a WTO member into a worse (i.e. substantively different) situation. 66 Conclusion Contrary to some popular scenarios which predicted for the UK a rather catastrophic position in the WTO after Brexit, the aim of this paper was to show that not only is the UK a full member of the WTO, but that it is a member with its own rights and obligations. The fact that these rights and obligations are currently bundled with other EU member states’ schedules changed nothing on this conclusion. 8. 61 HÄBERLI, Christian, Brexit Without WTO-Problems: For the UK? The EU? Global Business? , supra note 38. 62 BARTELS, Lorand, The UK’s status in the WTO after Brexit , supra note 13. 63 GATT Contracting Parties, Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions, Decision of 26 March 1980, L/4962. Available at: https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90970413.pdf. 64 Ibid ., paragraph 2. 65 Ibid ., paragraph 3. 66 RUPAREL, Raoul, Priorities for the new Department for International Trade post-Brexit, Open Europe, 27 July 2016 , http://openeurope.org.uk/today/blog/priorities-for-the-new-department-for-international-trade-post-brexit/.

505