CYIL vol. 8 (2017)

CYIL 8 ȍ2017Ȏ RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL … members of extremist groups was left to be exercised by states, only because the ratione personae and ratione loci jurisdiction of the ICC is in this matter strictly limited Conclusions The aim of this contribution was to explore some of the complexities in the application of the existing rules of international responsibility. It demonstrates that although international responsibility is established on similar principles in the context of state responsibility and individual responsibility, those regimes will always exist independently, not in a unified manner, although some concurrence of the two systems might appear. The responsibility of the individual in international law is criminal in character, while the state will never be held criminally responsible for committed crimes. The responsibility of a state is a legal fiction – it entails responsibility for the acts of the state’s organs exercising certain command or control in the name of that state or other organs or persons if acting under the state’s command or control. The responsibility of individual is grounded on the wrongdoing of that individual, he is a subject who will personally bear the responsibility, he will be sentenced and punished. The main problems demonstrated in the contribution refer to whom do we attribute international responsibility taking into account the illegitimate action of non-state groups such as terrorist groups and the illegitimate actions of unmanned weapons or robots. In the context of terrorist groups problems are connected with the legal status of such groups, specifically the lack of international recognition as legal person and the inability of attributing responsibility to such unrecognized international subjects. The international law seems to be undeveloped in this matter, leaving the question of the responsibility of such groups to the sole decision of states. Subsequently, taking into account the example of actions of such groups as are in Libya and Syria, such a gap in the international system of justice will definitely lead to the impunity of such groups, although it does not lead to the impunity of the members of such groups. Using unmanned weapons also causes problems with the attribution of international responsibility for breaches of international law in the following situations: – When no intent of the person in command (person commanding or controlling the weapon) could be demonstrated, – When no recklessness of such a person could be identified, – When it is impossible to define the scope of involvement of such a person in the acts of unmanned weapon or robots breaching international law. It seems that the solution to those problems lies not solely in compliance with international law, as suggested by some authors, 47 because international lawdoes not offer the answers on how to deal with the problems of developing technologies – and how to attribute responsibility for the actions of a machine (it is a more complicated question than using a traditional gun in an improper manner) and at the same time it does not give proper responses on how to react to the emergence of such the entities as ISIS and their breaches of IHL. It definitely calls for the further development of the law of international responsibility 48 and 47 For example by Klamberg, who claims that it is not necessary to adopt the new rules, as old ones still apply, see: KLAMBERG, M., International Law in the Age of Asymmetrical Warfare…, op. cit., p. 170. 48 We could definitely refer in this manner to the Project of A. Nollkaepmer on practice of shared responsibility in international law (see: http://www.sharesproject.nl/) and the study on shared responsibility: NOLLKAEMPER, A.,

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