CYIL vol. 9 (2018)

BIRUTĖ PRANEVIČIENĖ – VIOLETA VASILIAUSKIENĖ CYIL 9 ȍ2018Ȏ policy makers and commanders will be tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be killed, and under what circumstances, too expansively. States must ensure that the criteria they apply to determine who can be targeted and killed – i.e., who is a lawful combatant, or what constitutes ‘direct participation in hostilities’ that would subject civilians to direct attack – do not differ based on the choice of weapon.” 42 Another aspect that greatly influences the selection of an attack target is the accuracy of intelligence. Unlike Israel, which operates in a more or less familiar environment, the United States officials operate in Pakistan – 11,500 km away from its territory. The U.S. officials themselves, while speaking anonymously, acknowledge that they receive intelligence without even knowing how reliable this information source is. Its credibility is checked by other intelligence services, but the criteria for testing are unclear. 43 Much of the intelligence is based on local informers whose credibility is of concern. This is also evidenced by error cases, for example, in 2011 April U.S. forces killed two of their own soldiers when they were mistakenly identified as Taliban fighters. 44 A similar error occurred in September 2010, when U.S. forces targeted and killed Zabet Amanullah, who was a candidate for parliamentary elections; he and nine members of his staff were killed. 45 The U.S. offers bonuses for the indication of the people concerned that are so high that they can support a family, even a village, for life. Hence, such a large incentive can lead to the accusation of innocent people as terrorists, while getting square with someone, revenging someone, or simply to make a profit. 46 Compared to Guantánamo detainees, most of them were detained by offering bonuses for indication of those persons, but the vast majority of them were released without charge, finding that they were not even members of al Qaeda. 47 And in this case, people are not arrested but killed on the basis of information of similar credibility. 48 The accuracy of the targeted killings carried out by the United States also raises questions when taking into account the fact that the United States has allegedly killed several wanted individuals several times. For example, when it was announced that Ilyas Kashmiri was killed in January 2009, and in September 2009 he gave an interview to a Pakistani journalist. 49 Similarly, in the case of Baitullah Mehsud, when he was killed only on the fifth try, the victims of the first four attempts were civilians. 50 Similarly, the number of civilians killed in these attacks also indicates that civilians are not always (or inappropriately) distinguished from combatants when evaluating the effect 42 UN Human Rights Council. Study on Targeted Killings. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston. 28 May 2010. No. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6. http://www2.ohchr. org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf [accessed 22 May 2018], para. 80. 43 Living Under Drones, op. cit. 39, p. 126. 44 MIKLASZEWSKI, J. 2 US servicemen mistakenly killed by drone attack in Afghanistan, NBC NEWS, 11 April 2011. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42537620/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/us-servicemen- mistakenly-killed-drone-attack-afghanistan/ [accessed 22 May 2018]. 45 Living Under Drones, op. cit. 39, p. 127. 46 Ibid., pp. 127-128. 47 Ibid, p. 128. 48 JUNOD, T. The Lethal Presidency of Barack Obama, ESQUIRE , August 2012, https://www.esquire.com/news- politics/a14627/obama-lethal-presidency-0812/, [accessed 22 May 2018]. 49 Living Under Drones, op. cit. 39, p. 129. 50 Ibid.

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