CYIL vol. 9 (2018)

VIKTORIIA LAPA CYIL 9 ȍ2018Ȏ against the systemic effect of allowing the US interpretation of the security exception to stand have come true. In particular, in 2018 the US justified its steel and aluminum tariffs by reference to national security. 88 The US actions have already led to the responses from other Members of the WTO: be it the WTO cases submitted against it or imposed retaliatory tariffs. 89 Nevertheless, the US, is not the only state which uses the pretext of the national security: the security exception has been invoked by Russia along with other states. 90 While the Russian invocation of the security exception in its controversy with Ukraine is debatable, the US attempt to justify its steel and aluminum tariffs by reference to national security seems to be a long stretch. 91 As is seen, when it rains, it pours – and the security exception conundrum comes in a broader framework of problems of the WTO that all the Members should be ready to address. 92 Hopefully, this is not the dawn of the WTO, instead, these cases may give new lease of life for the Organization. As B.Condon points out – “We can only hope that the added pressure of the current crisis will create the necessary movement to break free of the deadlocks and reform the system in a way that works for the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century.” 93 With all the predicaments piling up, if the global world intends to preserve the trade system, the Member States should find the common ground, otherwise the organization is back to power-based relationships, which is opposite for what the rule-oriented system was devised and originally created. The advantage of a rule-based international trading system is that the rule of law prevails over the powers of nations, which provides some sense of justice and predictability for the states and companies alike. WTO Member States should work hard to preserve and update the WTO, otherwise the warnings brought by Czechoslovakia might be prophetic and the world trade system might move toward “the tendency towards autarky.” 94 88 For example, see Presidential Declaration US President, ‘Presidential Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States’ . For a critic of an abusive use see Jennifer Hillman, ‘Trump Tariffs Threaten National Security’ (New York Times, 1 June 2018) . 89 The complaints related to the US Section 232 tariffs could be found here LESTER, Simon. ‘Deciding Whether the Section 232 Tariffs Are Safeguard Measures’ ( International Economic Law and Policy Blog , 19 July 2018) . As to the EU tariffs see European Commission, ‘EU Adopts Rebalancing Measures in Reaction to US Steel and Aluminium Tariffs’ . 90 Fahner (n 1). 91 Hillman (n 88). 92 One of the problems is dealing with unfair practices of China, see proposals coming from HILLMAN, Jennifer. ‘The Best Way To Address China’s Unfair Policies and Practices Is Through a Big, Bold Multilateral Case at The WTO’ (2018) Testimony Before the US-China Economic and Review Security Commission . and BOWN, Chad. ‘The Accumulating Self-Inflicted Wounds from Trump’s Unilateral Trade Policy’ (Peterson Institute of International Economics 2018). 93 CONDON, Bradly J. ‘Captain America and the Tarnishing of the Crown: The Feud Between the WTO Appellate Body and the USA’ [2018] Journal of World Trade 535. 94 The EU and other Member States of the WTO also imposed tariffs against the US. BRUNSDEN, Jim. ‘EU Governments Back Retaliatory Tariffs on US Imports’ Financial Times (14 June 2018) .On the concise view as to legality of these tariffs see

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