CYIL vol. 9 (2018)

NINO PARSADANISHVILI CYIL 9 ȍ2018Ȏ exports including, inter alia , through the strengthening of their domestic services capacity and its efficiency and competitiveness.” 54 Following the positions of the UN/ILO and WTO cited above, the question is how the WTO is going to tackle the problem of poverty eradication through the expansion of service exports with special emphasis on the importance of participation of developing countries if there is huge resistance within the WTO for the inclusion of social clause into its daily operational agenda and in particular in the GATS scope of coverage; next to the fact that the Marrakesh Agreement (of which GATS is part) commits itself to the ensuring of employment and rising standards of living. The fact is generally acknowledged that the WTO is about trade and all the relations deriving from trade fall within the subject matter of its jurisdiction. Even though the organization has compulsory jurisdiction and enough tools to make the “rules of the game” established enforceable, 55 the question remains whether it is willing to add “ headache ” to the already over complicated, sensitive and delicate process of trade negotiations. As it is obvious from the practice of the WTO and especially the results of Singapore MC of 1996 the WTO has a straightforward answer “labour issues fall within the competence of the ILO, not of the WTO and accordingly the debate on the links between global trade and labour rights goes back to the ILO”. 56 The idea of putting labour rights or in particular Social Clause on the agenda of the WTO was raised during the Seattle MC as well in 1999 where WTO members were discussing the issue of the creation of an ILO/WTO working forum adding developmental, social and environmental policy issues to the topics for the discussion for better adjustment to globalization, but due to the opposition of a number of members, in particular from the South, no Ministerial Declaration was adopted and the future proposals to set up working groups appears uncertain. 57 At one point there is nothing surprising that the issue of Social Clause and in particular labour rights were fully delegated to the ILO, the organization with special competence in the field, but the primary question remains of how capable the ILO is to force states to implement labour standards being agreed upon. Non-binding requirements for states to ratify ILO conventions and therefore respect labour standards (notwithstanding the exception for the right of association) linked with the soft nature of the conclusions given by the ILO supervisory body, shows the importance of putting labour standards into economic agreements 58 as can be seen from the example of the WTO having not succeeded so far on the multilateral level. 54 GATS, Preamble. 55 For more information about the erga omnes nature of WTO Law please see: The WTO Sanctions Regime and International Constitutional Political Economy – Comments on the Paper ‘The Case against Reforming the WTO’s Sanctions Regime’ see NZELIBE, Jide, TIETJE, Christian, p. 4 – “one may argue that at least the core obligations of WTO law constitute obligations erga omnes ”. 56 BRONSTEIN, A. International and Comparative Labour Law (ILO 2009) p. 95; WTO doc. WT/MIN(96)/ DEC. 57 International Trade and Core Labour Standards, Policy Brief, October 2000, is available on [accessed 20 February 2015]. 58 DAOUDI, M. S. and DAJANI, M. S., Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience , (London) Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, cit.: Servais Jean-Michel, International Labour Law , 3 rd ed. p. 37.

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