CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

VASILKA SANCIN CYIL 14 (2023) made the object of attack, provided that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works or installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the protected works or installations. 6. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict are urged to conclude further agreements among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces. 7. In order to facilitate the identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting of a group of three bright orange circles placed on the same axis, as specified in Article 16 of Annex I to this Protocol [Article 17 of Amended Annex]. The absence of such marking in no way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations under this Article. ‘Attacks’ for the purpose of Article 56 are defined in Article 49 as ‘acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence’. Furthermore, Rule 42 of the ICRC Study on customary IHL, 30 applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts, 31 provides that, “Particular care must be taken if works and installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, and other installations located at or in their vicinity are attacked, in order to avoid the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.” Given the risk of release of radiation and consequent grave effects on civilians, parties to hostilities need to exercise extreme caution when conducting troop movements, manoeuvres and other military activities in the vicinity of NPPs, 32 and must endeavour to avoid locating military objectives, such as troops, weapons, or military vehicles, at or in the vicinity of nuclear power plants, except for the sole purpose of defending the NPP from attack. 33 While appropriate planning at the time of construction of NPPs should aim at avoiding such risk, it may be the case that a military objective, such as a strategically important bridge or works of the defence industry, is located in the vicinity of a NPP, or that a NPP finds itself close to moving frontlines. If a party to an armed conflict considers it has no option other than locating a military objective at the NPP or in its vicinity for reasons other than its defence, it must still bear in mind general IHL rules protecting civilians against the danger arising from military operations. 34 30 See https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule42 [accessed 1 July 2023]. 31 Article 15 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, applicable in certain type of a non-international armed conflict (not currently relevant for the armed conflict in Ukraine) provides: “Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 15. Article 15 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Officials Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.52, 6 June 1977, p. 138. 32 Art. 57(1) API; CIHL Rule 15. 33 Art. 56(5) API. 34 For example, it must locate such a military objective in the vicinity of the plant rather than at the plant itself, if feasible. See Art. 57(1) API; Art. 58 API; Art. 13(1) APII; Rules 22–24 CIHL.

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