EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ACTION / Alla Tymofeyeva (ed.)

Court’s view, the impugned article and its author’s offensive characterisation of S.P. had not contributed either to people being informed or to a socially responsible public discussion on the position of homosexuals. Constitutional judge C.R. submitted a dissenting opinion in which he referred to a climate of general tolerance towards intolerant and offensive statements against homosexuals. He further expressed the view that the lower courts had been biased and also that the Constitutional Court had failed to appropriately apply the standards of freedom of the press developed in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Questions: 1. Is the application admissible? If not, on which grounds? 2. Which provision(s) of the Convention may be complained of? 3. In respect to each provision, please respond to the following questions: 1) Does the issue fall within the scope of one of the substantive articles of the Convention? 2) Was there an “interference” with the right? 3) If yes, was the interference based on (authorised or prescribed by) “law”? 4) Did the interference pursue a “legitimate aim”? 5) Was the interference “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve the legitimate aim in question in the particular case and “proportionate” to that aim, taking into account the “margin of appreciation” accorded to the State in question? The same judge The Slovenian-based applicant company operates gaming and entertainment centres. On 19 June 1996, the applicant company’s then new managing director instituted disciplinary proceedings against one of its employees, N.N., in respect to the disciplinary offence of excessive and irresponsible use of the company’s funds. The new managing director had been informed about the alleged offence two days earlier. On 21 October 1996, the disciplinary board terminated N.N.’s employment on the grounds that she had seriously breached her employment obligations. An appeal lodged by N.N. against that decision was dismissed. On 24 December 1996, N.N. brought a claim before the Koper Labour Court, requesting that the termination of her employment be declared null and void. She alleged, inter alia , that the disciplinary proceedings against her were time-barred. In a judgment of 30 September 1997, the Labour Court dismissed N.N.’s request. Having considered that the applicant company’s former managing director had not had sufficient knowledge of the acts constituting the disciplinary offence, the Labour Court concluded that the three-month time-limit for the institution of disciplinary proceedings had started to run from the date on which N.N.’s disciplinary offences had been discovered by the new management of the applicant company. The court therefore held that disciplinary proceedings had not been time-barred. N.N. appealed against the judgment. On 17 December 1999, the Higher Labour and Social Court, sitting in a panel of three judges, which included judge M.K., upheld N.N.’s appeal and ordered the applicant company to reinstate her. Relying on a statement made by the applicant company’s former managing director, it concluded that he had had sufficient knowledge of N.N.’s actions to be able to institute disciplinary proceedings against her if he had considered that to be necessary. Accordingly, the

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EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ACTION