EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ACTION / Alla Tymofeyeva (ed.)

above §§ 94 and 95; Sidiropoulos, cited above, § 40; and Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria , nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, § 84, ECHR 2001-IX). When the Court carries out its scrutiny, its task is not to substitute its own view for that of the relevant national authorities but rather to review the decisions they delivered in the exercise of their discretion. This does not mean that it has to confine itself to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; it must look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in the Convention and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey , 30 January 1998, § 47, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I, and Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania , no. 46626/99, § 49, ECHR 2005-I (extracts)). The Court has also confirmed on a number of occasions the essential role played in a democratic regime by political parties enjoying the freedoms and rights enshrined in Article 11 and also in Article 10 of the Convention. Political parties are a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy. In view of the role played by political parties, any measure taken against them affects both freedom of association and, consequently, democracy in the State concerned ( Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and41344/98, § 87, ECHR 2003‑II, and United Communist Party of Turkey, cited above, § 25). Article 12 of the Convention Right to marry Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. General principles of the Court Article 12 of the Convention is a lex specialis for the right to marry. It secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry and to found a family. Article 12 expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national law. It enshrines the traditional concept of marriage as being between a man and a woman ( Rees v. the United Kingdom , 17 October 1986, § 49, Series A no. 106). While it is true that some Contracting States have extended marriage to same-sex partners, Article 12 cannot be construed as imposing an obligation on the Contracting States to grant access to marriage to same-sex couples ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria , no. 30141/04, § 63, ECHR 20). The exercise of right under Article 12 gives rise to personal, social and legal consequences. Both as to procedure and substance it is subject to the national laws of the Contracting States, but the limitations thereby introduced must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired (see F. v. Switzerland , judgment of 18 December 1987, Series A no. 128, § 32; and Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 29, ECHR 2002-VI). In consequence, the matter of conditions for marriage in the national laws is not left entirely to Contracting States as being within their margin of appreciation. This would be tantamount to finding that the range of options open to a Contracting State included an effective bar on any exercise of the right to marry. The margin of appreciation cannot extend so far ( R. and F. v. the United Kingdom , (dec.) no. 35748/05, 28 November 2006).

62

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ACTION