EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ACTION / Alla Tymofeyeva (ed.)

nonetheless similar. Whether the case is analysed in terms of a positive duty of the State or in terms of an interference by a public authority which needs to be justified, the criteria to be applied do not differ in substance. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole. It also holds true that the aims mentioned in that provision may be of some relevance in assessing whether a balance between the demands of the public interest involved and the applicant’s fundamental right of property has been struck. In both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention (see Broniowski , cited above, § 144, with further references). The first and most important requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful. In particular, the second paragraph of Article 1, while recognising that States have the right to control the use of property, subjects their right to the condition that it be exercised by enforcing “laws”. Moreover, the principle of lawfulness presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application (see, mutatis mutandis , Broniowski , cited above, § 147, with further references). The notion of “ public” or “general” interest is necessarily extensive. In particular, spheres such as housing ( James and Others v. the UK , § 45), which modern societies consider a prime social need and which plays a central role in the welfare and economic policies of Contracting States, may often call for some form of regulation by the State. In that sphere decisions as to whether, and if so when, it may fully be left to the play of free-market forces or whether it should be subject to State control, as well as the choice of measures for securing the housing needs of the community and of the timing for their implementation, necessarily involve consideration of complex social, economic and political issues. The public interest also includes combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], §§ 42-45), nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the UK , §§ 9 and 109), adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden , § 69), prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France , 22 September 1994, Series A no. 296-A, § 39), measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the UK , dec.), confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully (Honecker and Others v. Germany , dec., nos. 53991/00 and 54999/00, ECHR 2001- XII), transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], §§ 103 and 105). The protection of the environment is also considered to be in the public interest ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, 28 June 2018, § 295; Chapman v. the UK [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001-I, § 82). Finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, the Court has on many occasions declared that it will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is in the “public” or “general” interest unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation. These principles apply equally, if not a fortiori , to the measures adopted in the course of the fundamental reform of the country’s political, legal and economic system in the transition from a totalitarian regime to a democratic State (see Mellacher and Others , cited above, § 45; Scollo v. Italy , 28 September 1995, § 27, Series A no. 315-C; Immobiliare Saffi , cited above, § 49; and, mutatis mutandis , James and Others , cited above, §§ 46‑47, and Broniowski , cited above, § 149). The following relevant principles have been established by the practice of the Convention institutions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. (a) Deprivation of ownership or of another right in rem is in principle an instantaneous act and does not produce a continuing situation of “deprivation of a right” (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII, with further references).

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