EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ACTION / Alla Tymofeyeva (ed.)

imply in favour of its beneficiaries, the right to be educated in the national language or in one of the national languages, as the case may be ( Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium”, cited above, § 3). The right set out in the second sentence of the Article is an adjunct of the fundamental right to education set out in the first sentence. Parents are primarily responsible for the education and teaching of their children and they may therefore require the State to respect their religious and philosophical convictions (see Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” , cited above, §§ 3-5 and Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark , judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 23, § 52). The second sentence aims at safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in education which possibility is essential for the preservation of the “democratic society” as conceived by the Convention. It implies that the State, in fulfilling the functions assumed by it in regard to education and teaching, must take care that information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’ religious and philosophical convictions ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen , cited above, §§ 50 and 53; Folgerø, cited above, § 84; Lautsi , cited above, § 62). The rights set out in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 apply with respect to both State and private institutions ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen , cited above, § 50). In addition, the Court has held that the provision applies to primary, secondary and higher levels of education (see Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 134 and 136, ECHR 2005-XI). The Court however recognises that, in spite of its importance, the right to education is not absolute , but may be subject to limitations. Provided that there is no injury to the substance of the right, these limitations are permitted by implication since the right of access “by its very nature calls for regulation by the State” (see Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” , cited above, § 3). In order to ensure that the restrictions that are imposed do not curtail the right in question to such an extent as to impair its very essence and deprive it of its effectiveness, the Court must satisfy itself that they are foreseeable for those concerned and pursue a legitimate aim. However, unlike the position with respect to Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, it is not bound by an exhaustive list of “legitimate aims” under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis , Podkolzina v. Latvia , no. 46726/99, § 36, ECHR 2002-II). Furthermore, a limitation will only be compatible with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 if there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved ( Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 154). Although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this sphere. This margin of appreciation increases with the level of education, in inverse proportion to the importance of that education for those concerned and for society at large (see Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria , no. 5335/05, § 56, ECHR 2011).

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