EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS

EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS 2022

Prague, Czechia

which is also not subject to interruption, the authors do not deem that fact to be problematic. As far as the previous, but still applicable, legislation containing subjective and objective limitation periods is concerned, these could not be interrupted in any way. This fact may be considered as being in direct contradiction to the conclusions of the Whiteland Judgement, but the authors determined that this is not the case due to the specifics of this previous statute of limitations. This is mainly because the limitation period was defined in such a way the subjective period applied only in the situation when the OPC didn’t initiate the proceedings regarding a specific infringement in 5 years from the moment it learned that the infringement has been committed. After the OPC initiates the proceedings this subjective limitation period can no longer expire, and the specific infringement cannot thus be time-barred based on this subjective limitation period. In such a case, only the objective limitation period applies. The objective limitation period is then 10 years from the time the infringement was committed. From a substantive point of view, this means that the limitation period no longer needs to be interrupted once the proceedings have been initiated, since only the limitation period of 10 years from the date on which the infringement was committed applies, which corresponds to the legal regulation on the maximum length of the limitation period under Regulation 1/2003, if the case the limitation period under this Regulation has been interrupted. (see Article 22b(3) APC as amended until 30 June 2017). Even though the current Czech legislation is not in direct contradiction with the conclusions of the Whiteland , (see Whiteland , para 66(2)), as under the APC, notification of the initiation of the proceedings regarding the administrative offence is not the only nor the final action the OPC can adopt to interrupt the limitation period, the authors believe that the provision of an exhaustive list of actions of the OPC which lead to an interruption of the limitation period contravening the principle of efficiency. It may also have a significant negative impact on the preservation of the useful effect of competition rules laid down by the TFEU or EU law in general, and thus be in direct conflict with EU law. From this perspective, this could be a situation where the Czech Republic, as a Member State, makes it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to apply EU law, although specifically in the area of competition law it must ensure that the rules it lays down or applies do not prevent the effective application of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU. Such a regulation would then be in direct contradiction with the constant case law of the CJEU, see for example Whiteland , paras 46–47 or Judgement of the Court of Justice of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt (C‑360/09), EU:C:2011:389, para 24.

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