EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS

Prague, Czechia

EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS 2022

efficiency may arise, for example, from combining or utilising items for several purposes. Improved information availability also leads to increased efficiency. Operators can quickly collect and handle data thanks to the platform operation. For example, a platform could be utilized to better coordinate supply and demand. Knowledge gaps between user groups, for example, can be addressed via evaluation systems. If the rating system operates in both directions, poorly rated suppliers and customers or consumers, for example, may be prevented from utilizing the platform. This sanction mechanism reduces the incentives for misconduct for both user groups. From a competitive standpoint, it’s worth noting that sharing economy services frequently compete with established businesses (Whish, and Bailey, 2012). This is especially true with peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, which enable private individuals to offer their goods or services on a low-cost basis. This form of commercial service offered by private individuals is novel in many places, and it may contradict with the existing legal structure, limiting the expansion of P2P enterprises. Asymmetrical regulation can exacerbate competition between established enterprises and the sharing economy or peer-to-peer services. 3.3 A need for regulation? Many critics of sharing economy services argue that many of these services are not subject to or would not comply with the specific regulatory rules that apply to traditional providers in their respective industries, particularly those pertaining to consumer protection. Because of this feature, sharing platforms may charge less for their services, giving them an unfair competitive advantage (Karas and Králik, 2012). To minimize such competitive distortions between traditional and digital suppliers, it is often advocated that existing regulation be expanded to encompass sharing economy services. This criterion, however, ignores the fact that the introduction of new technology frequently reinforces the sense that established standards are no longer applicable. This is especially true for legislation aiming at removing potential information asymmetries, as the Internet in general, and digital switching platforms in particular, to reduce them. Due to external effects and knowledge asymmetries among users, the regulation of P2P services to avoid a market failure is called into question. The fact that P2P services may have a direct impact on non-users has external consequences. Individuals that want to provide specific services on P2P networks may establish minimal standards in this regard. Aside from external factors, knowledge asymmetries may explain a market failure in P2P services that necessitates regulation. Aside from external externalities and knowledge asymmetry, long-term market participant regulation may be successful in ensuring that the legislative obtains offers that the market does not. Overall, regulation of P2P services may be appropriate due to knowledge asymmetry, external impacts, or other policy goals.

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