EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS

EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS 2022

Prague, Czechia

carry insurance may give a financial incentive for them to do more extensive security checks on their products. The fact that the costs of such an obligation could act as a market entry barrier for potential new intermediary services speaks against a required statutory insurance requirement for intermediary platforms from a competitive standpoint. This could increase already existing concentration tendencies due to the platforms’ multi-sided nature (Šmejkal, 2016, pp. 105–114), making certain intermediary services’ market positions more difficult to fight, and reducing competition among platform services as a whole. Finally, because of the potential for concentration or monopolistic tendencies, as well as the associated competition challenges, it is necessary to decide whether intermediary services for private housing should be regulated. Private lodging intermediary services are two-way platforms that connect landlords as private housing suppliers with guests as private lodging purchasers. Potential visitors benefit from increased landlord presence, while landlords benefit from increased potential guest presence. In the sphere of private accommodation intermediary services, this mechanism demonstrates a degree of market concentration. Despite this concentration trend (Šmejkal, 2020, pp. 448–461), there is no economic reason for special regulation of intermediate platforms for private accommodation. It is feasible that a platform will gain a dominant position and employ abusive tactics to force competitors out of the market in order to raise rates or fees for landlords and guests (Svoboda, 2011, pp. 238–267). Negotiating exclusivity agreements that would prevent landlords from using many platform services at the same time (multihoming) or setting competitive pricing would be possible. Such aggressive action, however, is already covered by the appropriate competition statute. In this regard, it’s vital to realize that platform services frequently have minimal market entry barriers. Users, on the other hand, usually have low switching costs (Klemperer, 1995, pp. 515–539) because they are not in any way connected to a platform service, such as by paying expensive membership fees. However, it is debatable to what extent users’ willingness to transfer is hampered by their inability to delete their own ratings or reputation. 6. Conclusion and recommendations Because of digitization, there are now intermediary platforms where private persons can sell their accommodations for short-term rental for tourist purposes. Private lodging renting is not a new concept, but middleman businesses have boosted the supply of corresponding flats. The introduction of matching platform services into the market increases the competition for hotels and other accommodation facilities. Consumers gain from the new intermediary services by having access to a greater selectionof products andmaybe reducedprices, while private individualswhoprovide the services benefit from the possibility for higher revenue. The research focused on peer-to-peer (P2P) services, which allow private persons to sell products or

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