EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS

Prague, Czechia

EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS 2022

p. 224; Kornbeck, 2019, pp. 76–77; Van Rompuy, 2015, p. 207; Duval, Van Rompuy, 2016, pp. 245-278; Pijetlovic, 2014, pp. 161–162 & 185). 3.2.1 Counterbalancing transnational normative power of the SGBs The structure of organisation within the European model of sport is traditionally formed in the shape of a pyramid. One federation at the international level supervises activities of continental confederations which in turn are above the national associations (one per each discipline) with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and national Olympic committees acting as umbrella organisations. This simplistic scheme translates into a very characteristic feature of the whole model – monopolistic position of the SGBs on respective markets for regulation, organisation, and commercialisation of sports competitions in each discipline (with some minor exemptions like boxing). The omnipresence of this structure led to the formulation of remarks (Kolasiński, 2019b, pp. 600– 601) that this situation is a perfect example for a natural monopoly (sometimes validated by the state legislation – vide Article 13 of the Polish legal act on sport dated 25 June 2010). Simultaneously, the activity of the SGBs at the international and continental level is transnational and cross-border per definitione, as they have to enable uniform application and interpretation of sporting rules regardless of national borders. Hence, the SGBs are natural allies of globalisation – their global outreach guarantees them de facto immunity from national legal orders (Meier, Garcia, 2015, pp. 890–906) and functioning in the grey zone in-between the public international law and self-created autonomous regulatory regime (Hock, Gomtsian, 2018, pp. 186–204). Behemoth-size of international bodies like FIFA or IOC, their ultra -strong monopolistic market position, and exclusive self-regulatory competencies combined give the SGBs often the position of the parallel Leviathan – with private, non-democratic, yet regulatory and transnational power deprived of the strings attached to the social control (Duval, 2020, p. 33). In this context, the competition law of the EU may play a counter-balancing and democratising, thus constitutional, role thanks to its three features. Firstly, it is applied by an impartial, supranational, and independent authority – the European Commission – of the supranational organisation – the EU – which is democratically legitimated and subdued to the form of social control (even if vague) (Van Rompuy, 2015, pp. 206–207). Secondly, thanks to the so-called “Brussels effect” (Bradford, 2020), the normative power of the EU is spreading beyond its borders and its actions may have global influence, which is very relevant for dealing with actions of transnational entities (Garcia, Meier, 2016, pp. 850–870; Geeraert, Drieskens, 2017, pp. 79–94; Menon, Weatherill, 2008, pp. 397–416). Thirdly, the extraterritoriality of the competition law of the EU itself makes it a very useful legal framework to address the actions of legal entities

587