NATIONALIST POPULISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

NATIONALIST POPULISM AND POST-COMMUNISM: CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSES OF POLAND AND SLOVAKIA

Mgr. Tomáš Strážay, PhD.

2022

Reviewers: prof. Soňa Szomolányi, PhD. prof. Alexander Duleba, CSc.

© Tomáš Strážay © 2022 rw&w Science & New Media Passau-Berlin-Prague, an international publishing project of SüdOst Service GmbH, Am Steinfeld 4, 94065 Waldkirchen, Bayern/Germany and Eva Rozkotová Publishers, 266 01 Beroun, Czech Republic

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval systemor transmitted in any formor by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder.

Printed in Czech Republic. ISBN: 978-80-87488-47-8

Table of Contents

Summary

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1. Introduction

9

1.1.Nationalism and post-communism

9

1.2.Main goals

10

2. Theoretical background

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2.1.Notion of political culture

11 11 13 15 15 17 19 19 22 24 26 27 27 29 30 31 26

2.1.1. Is political culture a dependent or independent variable?

2.1.2. Mass and elite political culture

2.2.Nationalism

2.2.1. Nationalism as an ideology

2.2.2. About the “peculiarities” of East European nationalism

2.3. Populism

2.3.1. The understanding of populism

2.3.2. Nationalist populism

2.3.3. Nationalist populism in domestic and foreign policies

3. A short insight into the methodology

3.1.Why compare Poland and Slovakia?

3.1.1. The most obvious difference: geopolitics

3.1.2. Historical heritage: one region, but a different experience

3.1.3. Experience of independent statehood 3.1.4. Differences in the “communist unity” 3.1.5. Differences in ethnic structure

3.2. Summarising similarities and differences – historical, structural and political predispositions for the sustainability of nationalist populism

32 33 36

3.3. Political discourse and discourse analysis

3.3.1. Comparative political discourse

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4. Nationalist populism in the Polish and Slovak political discourses (1991–1992) 37 4.1.Nationalist populism in the Polish political discourse (1991) 37 4.1.1. Party manifestos 37 4.1.2. Electoral success of the political parties exploiting nationalist populist language 40 4.1.3. Media discourse (1991) 43 4.2.Nationalist populism in the Slovak political discourse (1992) 47 4.2.1. Party manifestos 47 4.2.2. Electoral success of the political parties exploiting nationalist populist language 49 4.2.3. Media discourse (1992) 51 4.3.Comparison of the Polish and Slovak political discourses 1991–1992: similarities and differences 56 5. Nationalist populism in the Polish and Slovak political discourses (2001–2002) 59 5.1.Nationalist populism in the Polish political discourse (2001) 59 5.1.1. Party manifestos 59 5.1.2. Electoral success of the political parties exploiting nationalist populist language 60 5.1.3. Media discourse (2001) 63 5.2.Nationalist populism in the Slovak political discourse (2002) 65 5.2.1. Party manifestos 65 5.2.2. Electoral success of the political parties exploiting nationalist populist language 67 5.2.3. Media discourse (2002) 68 5.3.Comparison of the Polish and Slovak political discourses 2001–2002: similarities and differences 71

6. Conclusions

74

6.1. Political language and political culture

74 75

6.2.Cross-country comparison – similarities and differences

4

6.3.Cross-time comparison – beginning of the 1990s and ten years after 77 6.4.Nationalist populism in the Polish and Slovak political discourses: final remarks 80

References

83

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Summary The attractiveness of ethnicity, nationalism and the related issues to a country’s population, together with their large mobilisation potential, have continuously presented a challenge for the political elite in Central and Eastern Europe. The instrumental use of these issues in communication strategies with the electorate has become an important tool for voter mobilisation. Along with the changing geopolitical reality in the post-Soviet space, prejudices against historical “others” have been rediscovered. At the same time, new “others” were invented. These recently invented enemies, together with the mythological “ghosts of the past”, quickly became popular points of reference for a significant part of the political elite in the CEE countries, including Poland and Slovakia. In this research study, there are three main tasks. The first aim is to identify and further analyse nationalist populist appeals in the Polish and Slovak political discourse in the period of the post-communist transition, through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the party slogans and media statements of representatives of the political elite. More generally, the analysis of the political communication is aimed at presenting an unconventional but complementary contribution to the study of political culture, especially in the countries undergoing a political, economic and social transformation. Even though language, as such, is not the only factor that characterises political culture, it can certainly serve as a valuable indicator of its state. The second task is to conduct a cross-country comparison, in order to highlight the similarities and differences between the Polish and Slovak political discourses in terms of the presence and usage of nationalist populist appeals. Apart from comparing quantitative aspects, such as the number of nationalist populist statements in the political discourse or the number of political parties employing nationalist populist rhetoric in their communication strategies, the qualitative similarities and differences are assessed, especially in relation to the thematic orientation of particular discourses. The finally task is to provide a cross-time comparison, which should underline the dynamics of changes in both the Polish and Slovak political discourses during the course of ten years. The analysis of the political discourse in Poland and Slovakia is expected to show that a significant part of the political elite in Poland and Slovakia is inclined to employ nationalist populism in their statements and party slogans, in order to address their voters and enlarge their volume of support. The advantage of nationalist populist appeals is based on the fact that they are easily usable for a number of purposes and reach a significant part of the population. Even though the main focus of such appeals is the nation, most of the political

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elite use them for the homogenisation of their electorate, without paying much attention to the national interests of the society. Therefore, it can be concluded that, even three decades after the regime change, nationalism and nationalist populism represent important challenges for both Poland and Slovakia, as well as for other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

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1. Introduction

All across Central and Eastern Europe, local historiographies represented their nations as innocent victims, nearly always victimised by other nations rather than by their own members. 1

1.1. Nationalism and post-communism A wide-spread argument connects the fall of the communist regimes around Central and Eastern Europe with an ideological vacuum. Early in the 1990s, some analysts pointed out that the ideology of nationalism might have filled this vacuum. 2 As Chris Hann rightly noted, after the fall of the communist regimes, the development of Central and Eastern Europe started to figure prominently in global discussions of “ethnicity” and “identity politics”, while a few scholars have used materials from this region to articulate more general frameworks in a comparative analysis. 3 The collapse of communism was accompanied by the need for a redefinition of the national or ethnic identities in Central and Eastern European societies. However, this reconstruction of the collective identity went hand-in-hand with a revival of the historically-based division between the mythical “we” and “others”. Under the authoritarian rule, inter-ethnic hostilities were more or less successfully frozen or were hidden under the surface. The communist system effectively provided the nations in the Soviet bloc with a new collective “other”, against whom some of them could define themselves. 4 It can be therefore argued that in the reality of the Cold War, the threat of the so-called historical enemies, de facto, did not exist. However, there was a certain problem with the reemergence of nationalist attitudes in the CEE. While some academicians underlined only the temporary character of the revival of nationalist ideology, others considered it to be a lasting phenomenon. Although the definition of nationalism and its prevailing forms 1 K. Verdery, “Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania,” Slavic Review 52, No. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 194. 2 Z. Brzezinski, Post-Communist Nationalism, Foreign Affairs , vol. LXVIII (Winter 1989/90), pp. 1–25. 3 See C. Hann, “Postsocialist Nationalism: Rediscovering the Past in Southeast Poland”, Slavic Review 57(4) . 4 See also M. Todorova, “Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe” , East European Societies , Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1993).

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in the region may differ from one scholar to another, nationalism continues to represent an important challenge for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe two decades after the regime change. In some of those countries, especially in the Balkans, nationalism reached the most violent forms; while in others it has been more moderate. Nevertheless, even in the countries labelled as the “transition leaders” 5 the presence of various kinds of nationalist appeals is apparent. The attractiveness of ethnicity, nationalism and the related issues to a country’s population, together with their large mobilisation potential, have continuously presented a challenge to the political elite in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, the instrumental exploitation of these issues in the communication strategies with the electorate has become an important tool for voter mobilisation throughout the so-called post-Soviet region. With the changing geopolitical reality in the post-Soviet space, prejudices against historical “others” have been rediscovered. At the same time, new “others” were invented. These recently invented enemies, together with the mythological “ghosts of the past”, quickly became a popular point of reference for a significant part of the political elite in the CEE countries. 1.2. Main goals In this research study, there are three main tasks. The first aim is to identify and further analyse nationalist populist appeals in the Polish and Slovak political discourse in the period of the post-communist transition, through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the party slogans and media statements of representatives of the political elite. The second task is to conduct a cross-country comparison, in order to highlight the similarities and differences between the Polish and Slovak political discourses in terms of the presence and usage of nationalist populist appeals. The third task is to provide a cross-time comparison, which should underline the dynamics of changes in both the Polish and Slovak political discourses during the course of ten years.

5 The term “transition leaders” includes the countries of the Visegrád Four (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Baltic Three (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) plus Slovenia. These are the countries which managed to successfully conclude negotiations with the EU and became members in the first wave of enlargement.

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2. Theoretical background

2.1. Notion of political culture

2.1.1. Is political culture a dependent or independent variable?

The political transformation of Central and Eastern European societies has been a complex phenomenon that can be described in terms of several dimensions. According toThomas A. Baylis, one of those dimensions is a change in the composition of the political elite, while a second is a change in their political institutions, and a third dimension involves changes in the popular and elite attitudes towards politics or the “political culture”. 6 It can be argued that in both phases of democratisation – the democratic transition and the consolidation of a new democratic regime – the political culture plays an important role. 7 However, its importance increases in the second, consolidation phase. In comparison to the transition phase, the second phase is usually lengthier, but – as Pridham and Lewis suggest – with wider and possibly deeper effects. 8 Besides of the full rooting of the new democratic regime, it involves the internalisation of its rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values .The process of dissemination, however, should sensitively reflect the local conditions. For instance, when the models of an institutional design are borrowed from the Western democracies and implemented without paying closer attention to the local specifics in particular countries, including the local political culture, then problems in the consolidation phase are likely to occur. As 6 See T. A. Baylis, “Elites, Institutions, and Political Change in East Central Europe: Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia”, J. Higley, J. Pakulski, W. Wesołowski (eds.) Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe. (Macmillan Press 1998), p. 107. 7 To explain my understanding of the term “democratisation”, I have borrowed a definition used by Pridham and Lewis. According to them, “democratisation as a term describes the overall process of a regime change from start to completion, meaning from the end of a previous authoritarian regime to the stabilisation and rooting of a new democracy. It therefore embraces both the broad processes of what are conventionally referred to in the comparative literature as the “transition ” to a liberal or constitutional democracy and its subsequent “consolidation”. The outcome is a system that should meet certain basic procedural requirements, such as a commitment to regular elections and institutional mechanisms that provide checks on the executive power, as well as the guarantee of human rights and the emergence of a political culture that is clearly supportive of political life (emphasised by T. S.). See G. Pridham, P. G. Lewis, “Introduction”, Stabilising Fragile Democracies. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 2. 8 Ibid.

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Pridham and Lewis noted, 9 some democracies have managed the transition but ultimately failed to consolidate. Theoretically, every new democracy in the CEE, including new EU members, could fail to consolidate. Although the accession to the EU was broadly perceived as the final stage of this transformation, at present, not all CEE countries can be labelled as a consolidated democracy. 10 Various definitions of political culture exist. 11 Some scholars employ the term political culture to embrace all the attitudes, beliefs, value orientations and sentiments towards politics that give order and meaning to the political process. However, the extended definition of political culture also embraces a behavioral dimension that pays a significant attention to the patterns of behaviour. Another group of scholars, especially those of an anthropological background, try to underline the symbolic dimension of political culture. A number of quantitative research surveys have been conducted by scholars in various parts of the globe. Among them, Almond and Verba’s pioneering study on the political attitudes present in the USA, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico plays a significant role. 12 However, although the existing quantitative surveys provide an interesting collection of data on the political attitudes and patterns of behaviour, they are far from presenting a full-scale picture of the state of the political culture in particular countries. Apart from the attitudinal and behavioural dimension, the term “political culture” also embraces an important symbolic dimension. 13 A political culture is a complex phenomenon that cannot be simply imposed on a particular society from the outside. The transformation of political institutions, as well as the transformation of social and economic structures alone, appears to provide insufficient conditions for enforcing change in attitudes and value orientations. In fact, the political culture can be considered to be a slow changing entity. I would argue that it has not undergone 9 Ibid. 10 See, for example, R. Markowski, “Polski system partyjny po wyborach 2001 roku”, Przyslość polskiej sceny politycznej po wyborach 2001 (Warszawa: Instytut spraw publicznych 2002) for the Polish case; and S. Szomolányi, “Dva rozdielne prípady demokratizácie – načo ich vôbec porovnávať?”, S. Szomolányi (ed.) Španielsko a Slovensko. Dve cesty k demokracii. (Bratislava: Stimul, 2002) for the case of Slovakia. 11 See, for instance, G. Almond, S. Verba The Civic Culture . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); L. W. Pye, S. Verba Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965). 12 G. Almond, S. Verba The Civic Culture . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 13 Complementary character of quantitative analysis and analysis of social symbols is stressed, for example, in the article of A. Pribersky, “The Symbolic Dimension. Anthropology and the Analysis of CEE Political Cultures”, F. Plasser, A. Pribersky Political Culture in East Central Europe (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996).

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any deeper changes in the Central European countries since 1989, regardless of the establishment of a new institutional design and the intensive actions of external factors (represented, for example, by NATO or European Union). Among other values, the ones related to the ethnicity, religion or nation display a lasting durability and are resistance to change. Due to this resistance to deeper changes, the process of the development of the “civic” type of political culture, in the sense used by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in their work The Civic Culture , is far from finished in Central and Eastern Europe. 14 An interesting approach to studying political culture is based on a political discourse analysis. A study of both qualitative and quantitative changes in the political discourse and political language of particular political leaders can be perceived as one of the most appropriate methods of identifying the continuity of the political culture in a particular country. Political culture, as G. Almond said, is neither a completely independent nor a dependent variable. 15 It underpins the political institutions, and at the same time it is sustained by them. I have taken Almond’s assumption as a convenient one and have also adopted it with regard to the relationship between political language and political culture. The aim of this research is to study continuities and changes in the political discourses and, analogically, to assess the prospects for a change in the political cultures of particular societies. 2.1.2. Mass and elite political culture The concept of national political culture as the political culture of a particular country is rather general and requires further specification. As Lucian W. Pye pointed out, there is no society with a single political culture. 16 Pye writes that: 14 According to Almond and Verba’s typology, there are three basic types of political culture. A “Parochial” political culture is associated with groups that have no knowledge of how the political system works, as well as no affective orientations towards it, and no desire or capability for participating in that system. A “Subject” political culture is one in which individuals have an affective orientation towards the political system, or some knowledge of how its policies are enforced, but little awareness of how its policies are made, and again have no desire or capability for participating in it. The previous ideal types are contrasted with the “Participant” type of political culture, in which the citizens are informed, make normative judgments and act on their beliefs. Almond and Verba’s “civic” culture is a type of political culture that is the most favourable for democracy; it is based on a congruency of the political culture with the political structure. See G. Almond, S. Verba The Civic Culture . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 15 G. Almond, S. Verba The Civic Culture . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 16 L. W. Pye, “Introduction”, L. W., Pye, S. Verba Political Culture and Political Development. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965).

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“There is a fundamental distinction between the culture of the rulers or power holders and that of the masses. Those who must deal with power and have responsibilities for the decisions of government invariably develop outlooks on politics different from those of the people who remain observers or marginal activists. Even in the most democratic societies, this distinction remains in spite of almost heroic efforts of leaders to pretend that they are of the same spirit as the common citizenry, and of citizens and commentators to feign that they are intimately knowledgeable about the inner workings of government.” 17 In reference to Pye’s observations, it can be argued that the political elite in transitory societies tended to accept “new” (democratic) values and patterns of behaviour quicker than the general population. This was mostly because they considered the integration with Western institutions to be an important goal for their countries, and so were pushed to accept the integration criteria. However, in the acceptance of democratic values, they were confronted with their own value preferences as well as with the “attitudinal demands” of their voters. Moreover, after the removal of foreign pressure, it turned out that the political elite tended to return to their old behavioural patterns that were characteristic for earlier stages of the country’s transformation. 18 The willingness of the political elite to fulfill the “attitudinal demands” of the masses is believed to increase before elections, when they are trying to attract potential supporters. Since the political elite are publicly known, the public assigns particular importance to their appeals and statements. This is also due to the fact that they have better access to electronic and print media. Even though the elite culture might be significantly different from the mass culture, and so could be the language of the elite, at election time the political elite usually resists introducing issues that do not coincide with public opinion or the attitudinal demands of the public. The relationship between the mass and elite political culture, as well the dynamics of changes in the political language, therefore remain interesting subjects for further research.

17 Ibid., p. 15. 18 In this regard, the performance of Fico’s new government in Slovakia and Kaczynski’s former government in Poland might serve as examples.

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2.2. Nationalism

2.2.1. Nationalism as an ideology As a phenomenon, nationalism is subject to a wide variety of meanings. It is definitely more correct to speak about a variety of nationalisms than about nationalism as a singular, uniformphenomenon. 19 Peter Alter, for example, has developed a typology of nationalisms, which to a large degree reflects the discussion on nationalism that has continued for almost half a century. He distinguishes between two basic types: liberal, reformist nationalism; and integral nationalism. The former is grounded in nineteenth-century liberalism (Risorgimento movement), while the latter has its basis in the narrow, exclusivist, right-wing European politics of the late nineteenth century. 20 According to Anthony Smith, the phenomenon of nationalism ranges from “ethnic” nationalism based on a particular cultural group to “territorial” nationalism founded on the “skeletal framework of the territorial state”. Between these two categories, he places a “mixed” form that contains elements of both “ethnic” and “territorial” nationalisms. 21 The common denominator of these different kinds of nationalisms is the tendency toward “exclusiveness”. While ethnic nationalism is centered around a common descent, which gives it an exclusive quality, economic nationalism favours market protection of the territory inhabited by particular ethnic group (nation). In the latter case, economic privileges are usually given to those segments of the population that are interrelated with the ruling political elite in many respects. Although economic interests play a dominant role in this type of nationalism, the role of ethnic factors should not be undervalued. Common ethnic bonds do have a significant impact on the decisions of the political elite, as well as in the field of economic policy. In other words, the economic “other” is often identical to the “ethnic” one. The supporters of an exclusivist nationalist ideology usually favour a “backward-looking”, closed conception of the nation, and aim to strengthen the national identity and statehood through cultural, language, economic and educational policies, as well as through closer co-operation with some popular 19 In the course of the survey of the definition of nationalismmade by Paul Latawski, nationalism was described as “A sentiment, a state of mind, a principle, an ideology, a doctrine, a theory of modernization, an historical process and a catastrophe. Perhaps nationalism is all of these things.” See P. Latawski (ed.) Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe . (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 5.

20 P. Alter Nationalism. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), p. 33. 21 A. D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism. (London: Duckworth, 1971).

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organisations, including the Church. They stress the importance of national sovereignty, even at the risk of international isolation. 22 I support neither the constructivist nor the primordialist definition. I rather conceptualise nationalism to be an ideology that holds the nation, and the nation-state, as crucial values and which manages to mobilise the political will of large segments of the population. 23 I agree an argument that nationalism is characterised by a dual identity – a peculiar and explosive combination of interests and an affective relationship – is appropriate to be made. National identity can be therefore described as a mixture of expressive relations and feelings, which exist side by side with instrumental and calculated political interests. 24 Each generation forms its cognitive map of the nation, but it does this in the midst of inherited notions surrounding a series of specific sets of myths and symbols. Using these raw materials, the nationalists proceed to ‘rediscover’ and ‘reinterpret’ their national ideological capital in accordance with the diverse political requirements and urgencies of each moment. 25 The adherents to either definition of nationalism would probably agree on the role played by traditions, stories, myths and symbols as powerful generators of feelings of affinity or exclusion, and of proximity or hatred among groups. They are manipulated and reproduced over time by the political elite in order to build the dichotomy between an insider and outsider, indigenous versus alien – or even a friend and a foe. 26 Regardless of its definition, nationalism represents one of the serious challenges faced by Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of communism. The transition periods from one political regime to another, which are typically accompanied by political and economic instability and social insecurity, create favourable conditions for the different kinds of nationalism to occur. This was proven in the case of the CEE countries. Moreover, the process of transition has been accompanied by the instrumental use of myths, which utilised to legitimise 22 This definition was applied by S. Fisher, in order to find similarities between the nationalist movements in Slovakia and Croatia. See Sharon Fisher, “The Rise and Fall of National Movements in Slovakia and Croatia”, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs , Vol. 1, No. II (Autumn 2000), also Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 23 P. Alter Nationalism . (London: Edward Arnold, 1991). 24 See J. Rothschild Ethnopolitics. (New York: Columbia University Press 1981). 25 See A. D. Smith The Ethnic Origins of Nations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986); A. D. Smith Nationalism and Modernism. (London: Routledge 1998); and also R. Máiz, “Politics and the nation: nationalist mobilisation of ethnic differences,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9, Part 2 (April 2003). 26 See R. Máiz, “Politics and the nation: nationalist mobilisation of ethnic differences,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9, Part 2 (April 2003), pp. 199–200.

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the political decisions and performance of the political elite. The old, so-called “traditional” myths, even those from ancient times, have been re-invented, while at the same time new, “modern” myths have appeared in the discourse. In relation to post-communism, Vladimir Tismaneanu, for example, noted that myths are responses to the sentiments of discontinuity, fragmentation and the overall confusion of the post-communist stage. They have the power not only to offer relatively facile explanations for a group’s perceived victimhood and failure, but also to mobilise, energise and even instigate large groups into action. 27 I have argued before that nationalism, which underlines the ethnic criteria for national membership and stresses the importance of the ethnic identity, holds a great potential to mobilise significant parts of the population, which makes it an attractive tool for the political elite. On the other hand, the representatives of the political elite tend to be perceived as the main supporters of democracy and democratic principles. As a result, the political elite in post-communist countries usually combine the concept of nationalismwith that of democracy and consider them to be complementary, even though they are rather contradictory. As Liah Greenfeld rightly note, because the classic democratic theory equates the people with citizens, the principles of human association, ethnic diversity and (liberal) democracy are by nature contradictory and antithetical. According to Greenfeld, the rights of communities and the rights of individuals cannot be ensured in equal measures. Plainly put, cultural validation and the empowerment of ethnic identity endangers (liberal) democracy. 28 In the light of the above, it can be argued that the division line between “good patriots” and “bad nationalists” is often blurred, especially where the Central European reality is concerned. For the empirical part of this study, I will therefore focus on three different manifestations of nationalism: positive self presentation; economic nationalism; and the derogation of ethnic “others”. 2.2.2. The “peculiarities” of East European nationalism The acceptance of differences in the socio-political and economic realities of Eastern and Western Europe has led numerous scholars to develop arguments about the differences between the Western and Eastern nationalisms. 29 For instance, as Dan Gheorghe Dungaciu noted, when one tries to explain 27 See V. Tismaneanu Fantasies of Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1998). 28 See L. Greenfeld, “Democracy, Ethnic Diversity and Nationalism”, K. Goldmann, U. Hannerz, C. Westin (eds.) Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era. (London and New York: Routledge 2001). 29 In this context, the term “Eastern Europe” encompasses both Central and Eastern Europe.

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Eastern nationalism, the tendency is to find historical patterns. 30 On the other hand, when it comes to the West, rather concrete present day causes and sociological explanations, as well as cultural, political, social or economic reasons are considered. A sharp distinction between “Western” and “non-Western” nationalisms also appears also in Hans Kohn’s book The Idea of Nationalism , while in his subsequent books he distinguishes “good” nationalism from “evil” nationalism. 31 In Kohn’s view, Eastern nationalism is “organic” in its nature. The nation is viewed as an organism with a fixed and indelible character that was “stamped” on its members at birth, and from which they can never free themselves. In this context Paul Latawski notes that: “The mixture of political oppression, regional ethnic diversity and social and economic backwardness provided a potent cocktail for the emergence of nations that placed a premium on linguistic, cultural and religious factors in defining national identity. Unlike the liberal West where the state created the nation-state, in East Central Europe the impulse for the creation of the nation-state came from people languishing in supranational imperial states. The desire of the peoples of the region was not so much directed to self-determination within a supranational state, but for the right to national self-determination in a territorial homeland (Heimat) often shared and claimed by a rival national group. Therefore, the nation state was defined in terms of the ethnolinguistic nation.” 32 Following this logic, several more arguments supporting the strict division between Eastern and Western types of nationalism can be found. It can be argued that in comparison with Western democracies, ethnicity and so-called ethnic nationalism still play quite an important role in Eastern Europe. One of the explanations for this might be a delayed and centrally-driven modernisation. On the other hand, the more favourable socio-structural and historical conditions do not automatically exclude so-called ethnic nationalism fromWestern societies, even though it might appear there in different, and perhaps more moderate forms. To conclude, ethic nationalism is nothing exceptional in the West, but due to the different socio-structural, historical and political conditions it is more visible in the East. 30 See D. G. Dungaciu East and West and “The Mirror of Nature”. (Vienna: Institute for Human Sciences 1999). 31 H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in its Origins and Background . (New York: Macmillan, 1946). 32 P. Latawski, “What to do About Nationalism?”, P. Latawski (ed.) Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe . (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 167.

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I do not intend to enter into the debate about the most appropriate definition of nationalism. Nevertheless, I am aware of the fact that a strict distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” or “civic” and “cultural” nationalism is not possible. Both of these categories of nationalism are complementary rather than contradictory, and are present in every society. However, for the purpose of this text, I will operationalise nationalism as an exclusionary ideology that stresses the social cohesion of one particular group of the population by appealing to its strict differentiation from other groups using ethnic categories, even in the field of the economy. From my point of view, an essential issue here is the level of identification of particular political leaders with the superiority of their respective ethnic group over other groups. In this regard, I partly agree with K.G. Minogue’s argument that nationalism might also be considered as a political movement, which tends to reach and defend “national” integration through feelings based on animosity toward “the strangers”. 33 When the political and economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe is taken into account, nationalism seems not to be solely an unpleasant remnant of the past, or a rhetorical phenomenon, but rather an influential factor shaping the socio-political development. Finally, one could agree with Paul Latawski who noted that besides the economic, political and social problems besetting a region after communism, nationalism stands alone as one of the most perplexing challenges to the construction of a new post-communist order, regardless of the stage of the transition. 34 2.3. Populism 2.3.1. The understanding of populism Although the definitions of populism vary from one scholar to another, it is generally agreed that it is a multifactorial phenomenon, which cannot be traced to any single cause. Some scholars consider populism to be an ideology – in their view the suffix “-ism” as such signals an ideological potentiation 35 – while others perceive it as a specific form of politics. 36 There are also different views on the democratic nature of populism. Some scholars argue that the Latin root of 33 See K. R. Minogue Nationalism. (New York: 1967). 34 P. Latawski, “What to do About Nationalism?”, P. Latawski (ed.) Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe . (London: Macmillan Press, 1995). 35 See F. Decker, “The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 3/2003. 36 See C. Mudde, “In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populism in Eastern Europe”. Y. Mény, Y. Surel (eds.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge . (New York: Palgrave 2002).

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the word populism – “populus” – exhibits a clear link with the democratic idea. According to them, the search for the more direct involvement of citizens is a central task not only for democracy, but also for populism. Thus, where there is democracy, there is always populism. 37 Populist parties, movements or political leaders usually see sustaining the gap between democracy as an ideal on the one hand, and as a political reality on the other. The main task for populist leaders is therefore to bridge this gap by direct, or at least a more intensive involvement of citizens in the political processes. In this regard, populism calls for principles that are equal to those contained in the theory of participative democracy. 38 However, as Margaret Canovan rightly noted, populism pushes and campaigns for a more democratic involvement of, and control by, the citizenry, which is only possible in a homogeneous community that fosters exclusion. 39 Due to this fact, populism has been studied as a phenomenon in the form of radical parties, protest movements and anti-system organisations. This point of view stresses the undemocratic character of populism, giving it pathological characteristics. In fact, populism resembles a pizza, which can have a different mixture of toppings. Other metaphors have been applied to populism as well. Y. Mény and Y. Surel compared populism to an “empty” shell, which can be filled and made meaningful by whatever is poured into it. 40 Accordingly, Paul Taggart noted that: “Populism has an essential chameleonic quality that means it always takes on the hue of the environment in which it occurs”. 41 “The people” occupy the central position in the concept of populism. However, in comparison to the theory of democracy, the people are defined as a group of citizens, who are usually being betrayed by another group that is considered to be much smaller. The main goal of populist movements is to replace – in the name of the people – the narrowly-defined elite that are in power. This aim, however, also affects the democratic institutions. Some political movements call for a more frequent use of direct democracy, such as referenda, or express a desire to put independent institutions under political control. A widespread attitude is that an anti-establishment stance is a key element of populism. Generally, populism might be characterised by a peculiar negativism that is “anti”: anti-capitalist, anti-urban, as well as xenophobic and 37 See also M. Canovan, “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy”, Political Studies , Vol. 47, No. 1. 38 See G. Sartori Teória demokracie . (Bratislava: Archa, 1994). 39 M. Canovan, “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy”, Political Studies , Vol. 47, No. 1. 40 See Y. Mény and Y. Surel, “The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism”, Y. Mény, Y. Surel (eds.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge. (New York: Palgrave 2002). 41 P. Taggart, cf. Y. Mény and Y. Surel, “The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism” , Y. Mény, Y. Surel (eds.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge. (New York: Palgrave 2002).

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anti-Semitic. 42 What makes populism really dangerous for democracy, however, is a consciousness that – to cite Mény and Surel again – it is an “empty” shell, which can be filled and made meaningful by whatever is poured into it. 43 The goals of populist leaders actually do not have to be that radical. Their decision to label a particular political party or political leader as “populist” depends on the chosen definition of populism. To start with, so-called populist does not have to have an anti-establishment attitude. On the contrary, populist leaders may even become part of the government. Jack Hayward convincingly uses the example of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. She saw herself as an “outsider” who, despite being the leader of the Conservative Party, was opposed by the so-called elitists inside and beyond her party. In other words, she was seeking to break the stranglehold of interest groups, hostile institutions and entrenched practices. 44 Political leaders or parties often use populist rhetoric during the time of elections. Electoral opportunism leads some political leaders, despite being themselves representatives of the political elite, to criticise the government for being “too elitist”. 45 Even if populist political leaders become part of the government, they may maintain their stance of being in opposition to entities that somehow endanger their position or threaten the supposed interests of the citizens that the government represents. There is still a need for the construction of a homogeneous identity, as well as efforts to present the people as a supposed unit, not only internally, as united in their fight against corruption or the communist past, but also externally, to distinguish that unit from other peoples and nations. 46 “The people” may then used not just as an abstract phenomenon, but also as a community united by blood, common descent, language and culture. 47 42 E. Gellner, G. Ionesco (eds.), “Introduction”, Populism. Its Meaning and National Characteristics . (The Macmillan Company, 1969). 43 Y. Mény and Y. Surel, “The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism”, Y. Mény, Y. Surel (eds.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge. (New York: Palgrave 2002), p. 6. 44 J. Hayward, “Populist Challenge to Elitist Democracy”, J. Hayward (ed . ) Elitism, Populism, and European Politics. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996). 45 Mény and Surel use the former French president Jacques Chirac as an example. See Y. Mény and Y. Surel, “The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism”, Y. Mény, Y. Surel (eds.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge. (New York: Palgrave 2002). 46 See also F. Decker, “The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 3/2003. 47 The latter concept prefers a traditionalist, organic view of the nation and contradicts the so called republican conception, which considers “the people” to be an abstract construction. See, for example, A. D. Smith Theories of Nationalism. (London: Duckworth, 1971) and B. Anderson Imagined Communities (London and New York: Verso, 1991).

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In the case of government officials, or MPs representing the government, it is sometimes more difficult to distinguish whether or not their rhetoric is populist. Because of their responsibility towards international organisations and institutions, they cannot use the same language as the parties in the opposition. This was especially true in the pre-EU accession period, when the government representatives were being observed very carefully by international organisations, such as the EU. If a politician – for instance, the prime minister – speaks in the name of “the nation”, he is not necessarily viewed as a populist. But if he speaks in the name of one particular nation (or ethnic group) and relates the interests of this nation (ethnic group) to the interests of the state, he becomes suspected as being a populist. Once he declares that the representatives of other nations (ethnic groups) threaten the interests of his own respective nation (ethnic group) in order to convince the citizens that he is the true guardian of the interests of the nation, he will surely be labelled a populist. 2.3.2. Nationalist populism Let us go back to the metaphors of the pizza and the empty shell. These two metaphors imply that populism is viewed as a political style, rather than an ideology. The definition of populism as a style of politics fits with the concept of my thesis. It suggests that populism gains its ideological connotation only after it becomes interlinked with an ideology. As Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner suggested in their pioneering work on populism, there exists a tendency for populism to be closely associated with, and sometimes to be absorbed by, stronger, more cohesive ideologies or movements, one of which is nationalism. 48 A combination of nationalism, which is understood as an ideology, and populism, viewed as a style of politics, creates a construct called national populism (or nationalist populism), which ties in very well with the purpose of this research study. Nationalist populist leaders exploit nationalism, which can be understood in terms of positive self-presentation, economic nationalism and animosity toward ethnic “others” in a populist way. Moreover, they address their statements to a particular ethnic group instead of to the country’s citizens. My understanding of nationalist populism is further explained in Scheme No. 1. Nationalist populismmight be perceived as a political style carrying a nationalist ideology, which contradicts the principles of liberal democracy and has significant mobilisation potential. 49 This mobilisation potential represents a challenge for the 48 E. Gellner, G. Ionesco (eds.) Populism. Its Meaning and National Characteristics . (The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 4. 49 M. Zaremba, for instance, underlines the unique and large potential of nationalist ideology to mobilise the people, which makes it very attractive for the political elite. M. Zaremba Komunizm, legitimizacja, nacjonalizm. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2001).

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political elite and explains to a large extent the high popularity of the populist use of ethnic identity, national symbols, myths, stereotypes and so forth.

Scheme No. 1

Nationalism Ideology Main characteristics: • Strict differentiation between one ethnic group and another ethic group • Tendency towards exclusion

Populism Political style Main characteristics: • Need for the construction of a homogenouse identity • Tendency towards exclusion

Nationalist Populism Mobilisation Strategy

Main goals: • Mobilisation of the electorate • Homogenisation of the nation (ethnic group) • Exclusion of “others”

Areas of manifestation: • Positive national self-presentation • Economic nationalism • Animosity toward “others”

As in the case of nationalism, some scholars have underlined the distinction between the “Western” and “Eastern” type of populism. Cass Mudde, for example, argues that: “While in Western Europe, the word populism is generally used to denote postmodern or ‘more moderate’ types of ‘Extreme Right’ or “Radical Right” parties, in Eastern (and Central – T. S.) Europe it is considered to be a more general phenomenon, spread across the ideological spectrum.” 50

50 C. Mudde, “In the name of the Peasantry, the Proletarian, and the People: Populism in Eastern Europe”, Y. Mény, Y., Surel (eds.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge. (Palgrave, 2002), p. 214.

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2.3.3. Nationalist populism in domestic and foreign policies According to John Higley, Jan Pakulski and Włodzimierz Wesołowski, elite unity and elite differentiation are crucial determinants of the stability of political regimes. Differences in the extent of elite unity and its differentiation from the populace define the main configuration of the political elite: strong or weak unity accompanied by wide or narrow differentiation. These configurations are in turn the principal determinants of the political regime: a stable democracy occurs where there is both strong unity and wide differentiation; authoritarian regimes occur where there is neither; unstable democracies occur where there is wide differentiation but weak unity; and finally, totalitarian regimes occur where there is strong unity but narrow differentiation. 51 From this point of view, the Polish and Slovak democracies, which are changing from an unstable to a stable form, could be characterised by a wide differentiation of the political elite on the one hand, but not very strong unity on the other, especially when their visions of liberal democracy are taken into account. It can be argued, however, that among the uniting factors for either the government or opposition political elite in both countries is their positive attitude towards nationalist populism, as will be demonstrated in the analysed political discourses. In the theory of international relations, nation states are perceived as the most crucial actors in international politics. In all likelihood this will not change in the foreseeable future, despite the speedy process of globalisation. Apart from maintaining their internal cohesion, nation states have to interact with other states in the global arena. According to the Realist approach to international relations, each nation pursues its “national interests” on the international arena. The balance of power among countries, which is also understood as the balance of their “national interests”, is perceived to be the prime determinant of the state’s behaviour and the most important component of its foreign policy. 52 As Ilya Prizel argues, while a polity must meet a set of preconditions in order to form a nation, it is the nation’s interaction with the outside world, namely its acceptance or rejection of the “other”, that allows polities to develop a sense of national uniqueness. Therefore, most nationalisms, apart from emphasising common cultural bonds, kinship or a common language and history among the members of that particular nation, also refer back to a conflict with an outside power. When a state pursues the interests of a particular ethnic group, an outside power, or the so-called “external other”, is defined predominantly in ethnic terms. Similarly, a popular notion of “national interest” used widely by 51 See, for example, J. Higley, J. Pakulski, W. Wesołowski (eds.) Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe. (Macmillan Press 1998). 52 See, for example, D. Miller et al. Blackwellova encyklopedie politického myšlení. (Barrister & Principal, 2003).

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