NATIONALIST POPULISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

of religion or new interpretations of the national identity were just some of the many issues discussed in both countries after the fall of communism. Contrary to Poland, political issues like the right to self-determination and their own statehood influenced the discourse in Slovakia significantly. The negotiated split of the common state, as well as the process of self-determination were among the dominant issues in the Slovak political discourse, where the Czechs were presented neither as enemies of the Slovak nation nor as an external threat. The Slovak political leaders rather pointed out the unequal position of Slovakia and the Slovaks in the federal state, and underlined the need for equal treatment. The significantly lower level of foreign investments, when compared to the Czech part of the federation but also to Hungary and Poland, practically excluded this issue from the Slovak political discourse. In the Polish case, foreign investors also occupied quite a marginal position in the political discourse. Among the most discussed issues were the position of the Polish minority in Lithuania, Polish-Ukrainian relations, anti-Semitism and especially Polish-German relations. The most powerful external “other” for the Polish political elite remained the Germans. The threats of German unification and expansionism were accompanied by fears relating to the strong German economy, especially in the context of returning the land and property gathered by the Polish state after World War II back to the German owners. The Polish German declaration did not stop these fears; on the contrary, its adoption evoked quite an intense reaction on the side of the Polish political elite. In the case of Slovakia, the most important external and internal “others” were the Hungarians. The main reasons for this were historical, such as the forced Magyarisation or occupation of Southern Slovakia during WW II, although the existence of the numerous Hungarian national communities living in the territory of Slovakia was also an influential factor. The Hungarian minority and its representatives were often described as the “fifth column” and not as partners participating in the state-building process. Although the relations between Bratislava and Budapest were influenced by the matters like the Gabčíkovo Nagymaros case, the dominant issue remained the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Apart from being presented as a powerful external “other” – similarly to Germany in the Polish case – Hungary was also recognised as an influential factor that intervened in the Slovak domestic politics, namely with regard to the relationship between the Slovak majority and Hungarian minority. This made the Slovak case different from the Polish one. Despite the abovementioned differences, the language of the political elite in Poland and Slovakia had a lot in common. First of all, the reinvention of historical enemies – like Germany for Poland and Hungary for Slovakia – shaped the political discourse in both countries to a large extent. Even though Poland, contrary to Slovakia, could be characterised as a country with a significantly low

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