NATIONALIST POPULISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

main similarities between them and reflect the dynamics of development over time. In both cases, the formation and reproduction of the discourse was highly dependent on the political language that was used. On the basis of the empirical evidence, based on the cross-time and cross-country comparisons, at least some modest conclusions can be made. First, the analysis showed that the distinction between “we” and “others” was extraordinary powerful in all types of the examined discourses. Imaginary “others” included both the traditional ethnic “others” – usually the representatives of neighbouring nations or national minorities (Germans, Jews and Hungarians) – and new ones, who were usually presented as economic enemies (foreign investors and the EU). Ethnic “others” were latently present even in the statements focusing on positive national self-presentation. Secondly, the empirical evidence showed that the usage of ethnically-based nationalist populist appeals was not correlated with the actual ethnic structure of a particular society. My findings proved that more similarities than differences existed between the Polish and Slovak cases, when the usage of ethnically-based nationalist populist statements and slogans in the political discourses was taken into account. Since the current ethnic structure of the Polish and Slovak societies are different, other intervening factors need to be identified. In this regard, the selective reproduction of historically-based prejudices and nationalist symbols might play an important role in developing the patterns of communication and language among the political leaders. This conclusion applies to both cases, but is especially evident in the Polish case. It is also important to note that in both cases, the primary purpose of using nationalist populist statements by the political elite was not the national interests of the society, but the homogenisation of the group of supporters. In other words, the political elite tended to use nationalist populist appeals in order to enlarge their electorate and to eliminate their political opponents. Thirdly, nationalist populist appeals and slogans displayed lasting viability in the political discourses of the two countries. This was especially obvious in the case of the media statements of the political leaders, although the analysis of the party slogans led me to a similar conclusion. Apart from the demand-supply relationship between the public and the political elite, other factors should be considered in order to explain this phenomenon. Personal continuity can be one of them – the language of the representatives of the political elite does not change much over time. In fact, the political leaders often tend to react to different challenges with the same (or similar) language and rhetoric. Fourth, the political elite did not tend to use nationalist populist language accidentally. Instead, they considere nationalist populist appeals to be an efficient instrument to address the general public, and especially new voters or supporters. The popularity of nationalist populist appeals was obvious in

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