New Technologies in International Law / Tymofeyeva, Crhák et al.

in different forms in their internal and external affairs. 559 This example show the way how the power-balance is upset and is being shaped by the new technologies and digitalization. In sanctions law, this dynamic has already materialized in different ways. For instance, new technologies are employed to circumvent sanctions imposed often by powerful states as state above. 560 Digital currencies or blockchain technology are most relevant in this respect – the decentralised and anonymous nature of such technologies could make it rather difficult to prevent sanctions-evasion. It is very likely that these technological advances will fundamentally alter the field of sanctions, albeit one has to admit that currently, in many instances, the imposition of sanctions is still effective. Additionally, these technological developments may prove to be useful when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions (e. g. by using AI for sanctions screening). Thus, while the existing literature tends to emphasize the negative impact of new technologies on the effectivity of sanctions, I argue that the picture is more nuanced and the said pessimism is not entirely warranted. In any case, the analysis concerning the imbalances/inequalities that we mentioned above should be more nuanced as digitalization is in some respect janus-faced. It is not merely a tool/instrument for powerful states to further consolidate the actual power structure on the international level but on the contrary, the existing order might even be in some cases upended and challenged. Secondly, it is argued that the nature of rules is affected by digitalisation, including the legal framework on sanctions. In particular, the claim is that we moving towards a structural change in the context of legal norms, resulting in the “flexibilization of rules”. 561 This contention is warranted and we argued above that the EU cyber sanctions regime is also characterized by it. As explained above, the relevant Regulation on cyber sanctions is vague and open-ended, giving the Council a wide discretion. On the one hand, due to the rapid development of technologies which might then be deployed in the future for malicious purposes partly justifies this flexibilization, since in some cases it is vital to react in a sufficient manner. It shall be emphasized nonetheless that even if this sort of indeterminacy is not alien to international legal rules, the danger of abuse looms large. A simultaneous trend specific for the cyber field is informalization, 562 relevant for cyber sanctions as well. This informalization is connected with the growing role of private actors in the digital sphere when it comes to norm-setting power and cyber sanctions. Self-regulatory initiatives by private actors are expanding, having an informal character, including different codes of conduct, non-binding documents et cetera . 563 A certain risk 559 This can be seen in other context too. See for instance: Nguyen A, ‘The G7’s Fear of Economic Coercion through Weaponised Interdependence – Geopolitical Competition Cloaked in International Law? ’ ( EJIL , 22 June 2023) accessed 31 December 2023. 560 Demarais A, Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World against U.S. Interests (Columbia University Press, 2023); Abusedra A, Bakar A, Islam MT, ‘Use of Cyber Means to Enforce Unilateral Coercive Measures in International Law’ in Subedi SP (ed), Unilateral Sanctions in International Law (Hart, 2022). 561 Burchardt D, ‘Does Digitalization Change International Law Structurally?’ (2023) 24 German Law Journal 438, pp. 448–449. 562 Ibid. 563 Pawlak P and Biersteker TJ, ‘Guardian of the Galaxy. Eu Cyber Sanctions and Norms in Cyberspace’ ( Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies , October 2019)

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