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of Antarctica or the high seas. 651 However, States have traditionally been cautious in particular towards cyberspace regulation. The reasons for this reluctance are twofold: Firstly, natural asymmetries in cyber warfare led to what some have called the Glass house dilemma. Powerful States are on one hand incentivized to opt for a more permissive system in which their technological edge allows for less restrictive manifestation of power. On the other hand, however, their overreliance on technology exposes them to new cyber threats from State and non-State actors with a fraction of their power. This leads to a legislative schizophrenia, where mutually exclusive interests collide and paralyzes those States that would ideally be at the forefront of any normative efforts. 652 Secondly, the post-Tallinn practice showcased that States general stance towards the Tallinn manual is that of optionality. There are doubts whether the Manual is reflective of existing international law in the context of cyberspace, or merely the articulation of the views of an international group of experts on how international law should be applied. 653 Especially when such views are predominantly expressed by Western experts and only with limited State involvement. 654 Some Chinese observers have not hesitated to describe the Manual as a tool in hands of the US for manipulating the international legal process. 655 Conversely, there have been public statements from Western statesmen registered characterizing the Manual as aiding fostering State’s positions and actions, or even as “the first step in codifying the cyberlaw”. 656 The Tallinn manual in effect touches on a much broader issue of the legitimacy of the role of experts in international law making. As it has been pointed out by the ICJ itself in the previously mentioned Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion , only the States have the power to create law. 657 In this regard, some authors argue that States naturally in their own interest refuse to delegate this function to others and overtly acknowledge an external normative source. On the other hand, this does not rule out any implicit inspirations in formulation of their future positions. 658 Yet the Tallinn Manual might instead simply represent the category determined by the art. 38, (1), (d) as the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. 659 After all, its role as 651 Macak K, ‘On the Shelf, but Close at Hand: The Contribution of Non-State Initiatives to International Cyber Law’ (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 81, p. 82. 652 Ibid., pp. 82–83. 653 Efrony D and Shany Y, ‘A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice’ (2018) 112 American Journal of International Law 583, p. 589. 654 Luor T, Wang JF and Lu HP, ‘Trends in and Contributions to Tallinn Manual Research: An Assessment of the Literature from 1998 to November 2022’ (2023) 27 Informatica Economica 45, p. 46. 655 See ex.: Ku J, ‘Tentative Observations on China’s Views on International Law and Cyber Warfare’ ( Lawfare , 26 August 2017). 656 Kersti Kaljulaid, President of the Republic of Estonia (Keynote Speech at CyCon 2017, Tallinn, 31 May 2017); Stef Blok, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (Keynote Speech by the on First Anniversary of Tallinn Manual 2.0, 20 June 2018); Zoran Milanović, Prime Minister of Croatia, “Tallinn Manual is an Icebreaker” (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence visit, Tallinn, 27 January 2015). 657 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 1996, para 6. 658 Tsagourias N, ‘The Slow Process of Normativizing Cyberspace’ (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 71, p. 74. 659 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, Art. 38, para 1, s. d.

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