Střety zájmů při ochraně biodiverzity a klimatu

coordinated withdrawal has gained prominence in scholarly debates. This approach involves a group of states simultaneously withdrawing from the treaty and concluding a separate agreement inter se on the mutual non-application of the sunset clause . This allows a group of treaty parties to modify the treaty’s application among themselves, provided it does not affect the rights of other parties or conflict with the treaty’s objectives and purposes. 56 The argument is that an agreement to mutually disapply the sunset clause among withdrawing states meets this requirement. A more systematic alternative is a proposal to replace the current arbitration system with a permanent public multilateral investment court (MIC). 57 Proponents of this proposal argue that MIC, with tenured judges and an appellate mechanism, would foster a more consistent, coherent, and predictable jurisprudence. While negotiations are ongoing, such a court may, in theory, be given a clear legal mandate to reconcile the investor protection with other branches of international law, including climate obligations. 58 5. Conclusion This paper discusses the systemic conflict between the international investment law and international climate law, arguing that it constitutes a profound normative tension between two distinct legal regimes. Through a doctrinal analysis of the ECT, it has been established how this conflict manifests itself by transforming a framework designed to protect foreign investors into a constraint on the sovereign regulatory power necessary to address the climate crisis. 56 BRAUCH, M. D. Should the European Union Fix, Leave or Kill the Energy Charter Treaty? Blogdroit- européen . Online. 2021. Available from: https://blogdroiteuropeen.com/2021/02/09/should-the-euro pean-union-fix-leave-or-kill-the-energy-charter-treaty-by-martin-dietrich-brauch/; SCHAUGG, Lukas a Suzy H. NIKIÈMA. Model Inter Se Agreement to Neutralize the Survival Clause of the Energy Charter Treaty Between the EU and Other non-EU Contracting Parties. International Institute for Sustainable Development , 2024. 57 Council of the European Union. Negotiating Directives for Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 12981/17 ADD 1, 1 March 2018, Brussels; UNCITRAL Working Group III, 75th UN GA. Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Appellate Mechanism and Enforcement Issues, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.202, 2020; BUNGENBERG, M. a A. REINISCH. From Bilateral Arbitral Tribunals and Investment Courts to a Multilateral Investment Court . Heidelberg: Springer Berlin, 2019. ISBN 978-3-662-59731-6. 58 For completeness, it should be added that critics or sceptics contend that MIC risks entrenching the very legitimacy crisis it seeks to resolve, potentially rebranding ISDS with a ‘cloak of legitimacy’ while falling to address inequalities and preserve to balance investor-state relations, see DIEPENDAELE, Lisa, DE VILLE Ferdi and Sigrid STERCKX. Assessing the Normative Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration: The EU’s Investment Court System. Online. New Political Economy . 2019, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 37–61. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1417362 [accessed 2025-8-31]; BRODLIJA, F. The Multilateral Investment Court: Necessary ISDS Reform or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?. Online. Arbitration Law Review . 2024, Vol. 15, pp. 1–18; LEE, Seung-Woon. ISDS Reform: Analysis on Establishing a Multilateral Investment Court System. Online. Arbitration: The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management . 2021, Vol. 87, Issue 4, pp. 484–506. Available from: https://doi.org/10.54648/amdm2021041 [accessed 2025-8-30].

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