Toothless European Citizenship / Šimon Uradnik

constantly reborn or granted the nationality by a public authority in order to fulfil the legal title continuously, nor does a Union citizen need to be constantly in possession of the Member State’s nationality in order to fulfil the legal title continuously. Thus, what is relevant is only the very moment when the legal title intersects with the legal fact — either a constitutive decision, a birth, or even possession of the Member State’s nationality. On this basis, it should be said that just as the sole existence of the legal relationship of the Member State’s nationality is autonomous on any legal fact, so is the sole and further existence of the legal relationship of Union citizenship, beyond and from the point of its emergence, autonomous on the legal fact — possession of the nationality of a Member State — also. 235 Henceforth, the legal relationship of Union citizenship exists until it is changed or terminated by another legal title which would intersect with another anticipated legal fact. Whence it is reasonable to conclude that the existence of the form-status of Union citizenship is of an autonomous character. 3.2.4 Derivative Character of Termination of Union Citizenship For the comprehensive assessment, the final segment, the termination of the legal relationship of Union citizenship must not be omitted. Once and for all, a legal relationship terminates at the point of the intersection of the legal title with the anticipated legal fact. On this basis, the author draws two opposite premises. First — there is no legal title related to ‘non-possession’ of the Member State’s nationality for the termination of the legal relationship of Union citizenship; therefore, Union citizenship would remain true autonomous beyond the emergence as the loss of the nationality of a Member States could not affect it. Second, the opposite — Union law, concretely, Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU contains such a legal title 235 W. T. Worster comes to a partially similar conclusion also, yet through a different path of argumentation. Even though he does not doctrinally distinguish between the emergence and the existence, he senses that the only derivative part of Union citizenship is solely the emergence. To that, he states: ‘EU citizenship is dependent on member state nationality, but only for purposes of acquisition. EU citizenship is acquired when a person has EU member state nationality. Thus, whether an individual acquires EU member state nationality is primarily within the discretion of the member state‘s nationality laws. In this way, it is dependent on having EU member state nationality. As such, there is an „independent“ EU citizenship that is nonetheless „linked“ to EU member state nationality.’ For this purpose, see William Thomas Worster, ‘Brexit as an Arbitrary Withdrawal of European Union Citizenship’ (2021) 33/1 Florida Journal of International Law 110.

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