CYIL vol. 11 (2020)

ONDREJ HAMUĽÁK CYIL 11 (2020) Weatherill (eds): The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument – Five Years Old and Growing, 2015; Varju: European Union Human Rights Law. The Dynamics of Interpretation and Context, 2014). In the first period of academic reflection of the Charter (2000–2009, the period prior to binding force of Charter) attention was paid mainly to the nature and content of the Charter (Búrca: The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2001), its importance for European integration, development of fundamental rights protection in Europe, and the impact of the Charter on the EU legal system as such (Weiler: Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights?, 2000; Lenaerts: Fundamental Rights in the European Union, 2000; Betten: the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights: a Trojan Horse or and Mouse?, 2001; Goldsmith: a Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles, 2001; Dutheil de la Rocher: The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, 2004). The Charter was evaluated as a revolutionary document that has brought breakthrough changes in access to fundamental rights, the authors especially underline its universal ethos and cataloguing of different types and generations of fundamental rights in a single document (Šišková: Actual Issues of the Creation of Constitutionalism in the Field of Human Rights at the EU Level and ITS Prospects, 2008). It was also mentioned as a tool for strengthening the democratic legitimacy and the rule of law in the EU (De Smijter, Lenaerts: A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union, 2001). The broadly defined scope of application of the Charter (binding for EU institutions and also, in a limited scope, for the Member States) opened the discussions on deepening of federal tendencies in European integration (Eeckhout: The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question, 2002; Knook: The Court, the Charter, and the vertical division of powers in the European Union, 2005). The Charter also gave rise to discussions about changes in the relationship between EU law and the law of the Member States (Liisberg: Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights threaten the Supremacy of Community Law, 2001; Besselink: The Member States, the National Constitutions and the Scope of The Charter, 2001). Since 2009 (when the Charter became legally binding), the academic interest has been focused more on the practical effects of this catalogue, both at national and EU level. In this “second” phase of reflection of the Charter, attention is focused on the interpretation of the so-called horizontal provisions (Articles 51-54 of the Charter) in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (Hancox: The Meaning of “Implementing” EU law under Article 51(1) of the Charter: Akerberg Fransson, 2013; Pech: Between judicial minimalism and avoidance: The Court of Justice’s sidestepping of Fundamental constitutional issues in Römer and Dominguez, 2012; Dougan: Judicial review of Member State action under the General principles and the Charter: Defining the “scope of Union law”, 2015; Guðmundsdóttir: A Renewed Emphasis on the Charter’s Distinction Between Rights and Principles: Is a Doctrine of Judicial Restraint more Appropriate?, 2015), the importance of the Charter within the Union’s constitutional architecture (De Búrca: After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator ?, 2013; Iglesias Sanchez: The Court and the Charter: The impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s approach to Fundamental Rights, 2012), the impact of Charter within specific areas of protection of fundamental rights and the impact of the Charter in the framework of national practice (Sarmiento: Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, national courts and the new framework of Fundamental

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