DALIBOR JÍLEK – JANA MICHALIČKOVÁ CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ and sufficiency. Some participants of the session relied on strict formalism. They required the content of the concept of domicile of choice to become a formalistic requirement: a written manifestation of will and a registration. The legal will was distinct from factual will in such a requirement of a written manifestation of will and registration. Factual will appeared to be the sufficient component. Despite Mancini’s absence the session was mastered by the Italian legal school, represented by a single lawyer. Pierantoni rigorously enforced Mancini’s ideas. He suggested using the internal law of the state to which the individual belonged instead of domicile of origin for cases of composite legal order. 39 Pierantoni’s draft thus ingeniously avoided the yearlong conflict between supporters of domicile of origin and domicile of choice. However, he supressed the application of both types of domicile. According to this Italian lawyer, personal status should have been regulated by the national law of the state to which the person belonged. So Art. VI then acquired the following wording: L’ état et la capacité d’une personne sont régis par les lois de l’Etat auquel elle appartient par sa nationalité. Lorsqu’une personne n’a pas de nationalité connue, son état et sa capacité sont régis par les lois de son domicile. Dans le cas où différentes lois civiles coexistent dans un même Etat, les questions relatives à l’ état et à la capacité de l’ étranger seront décidées selon le droit intérieur de l’Etat auquel il appartient. Status and capacity of a person shall be governed by the law of the State to which a person belongs through his nationality. When a person has no known nationality, his status and capacity shall be governed by the law of his domicile. When different civil laws coexist in one and the same State, questions concerning status and capacity of a foreigner shall be decided according to the internal law of the State to which he belongs. 40 The principle of nationality was anchored in the disposition of a general rule, whereas the domicile of choice and national law regulated the legal status and capacity of a person as a normative exception. Pierantoni defined what was general and what was the specific connecting factor for personal status. In a semantic view the clash between the concepts was decided in favour of nationality. In that Oxford
39 RAITERI, Marco. Citizenship as a Connecting Factor in Private International Law for Family Matters. Journal of Private International Law , August 2014, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 311. 40 Institut de Droit International, Session d’Oxford, 1880, Principes généraux en matière de nationalité, de capacité, de succession et d’ordre public, p. 1.