CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ THE CONCEPTUAL ROLE OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE which he returns in the intervals between his tours. 94 The Court thus offered an interpretation for idiosyncratic, itinerary situations. The intention of the Court was to offer neither a descriptive nor a stipulated nor explicative definition. Its definition of a permanent residence relying upon the constituent word ‘habitual residence’ depends on the normative context, social situation and emanates from experience. The definition provided by the Court of Justice is pre-eminently ostensive. The court used the term ‘centre’ for explication of the permanent residence and attributed a fundamental role to it. Already several years before De Steiger and De Winter had explained the concept of habitual residence in international private law by means of this very term. They had added the term ‘life’ or ‘existence’. Contrary to this, the Court joined the term ‘centre’ with the other terms of ‘permanent’ and ‘interest’. The term ‘permanent’ is connected with the ordinary meaning of the term ‘habitual’. And, as Holbach writes, interest is the sole motivation of human conduct. 95 In the sense of Holbach’s formula, interests definitely are not mere motivational dispositions. 96 Interests are at the same time categories of both relation and interaction. Interests refer to relations among individuals and to relations among individual and particular objects or activities. Relations are thus developed interactions of subject(s)-to-subject(s) and subject(s)-to-object(s) or activity(ies). The concept of habitual residence used in Art. 1 (h) of Regulation No 3/58 first settled in social law like it did in German law. 97 The concept was specified by the constituent of ‘habitually resides’. Following Regulation No 1408/71 satisfied the need for general revision of its predecessor – Regulation No 3/58 on social security for migrant workers. 98 This secondary formal source contained in Art. 1 (h) a definition not relating to permanent residence but exclusively to the residence to which it allocates a simple content: ‘Residence’ means habitual residence. The terms used are of semantic equality, whereas the concept of habitual residence is placed to be definiens . In the Swaddling case the Court attributed a Community-wide meaning to the term ‘residence’. 99 The Court could have signified that the singular content of the concept should apply for all cases, not only to social security issues. However, 94 Judgement of the Court 12 July 1973, Angenieux v Willy Hakenberg , case 13/73, p. 951. 95 HOLBACH, Paul Heinrich Dietrich. Systeme de la Nature Ou des Loix du Monde Physique & du Monde Moral . Londres: Nouvelle Édition, 1793, p. 312. 96 SILVIA, Paul J. Exploring the Psychology of Interest . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 13. 97 ANDERSON, KAREN M. Social Policy in the European Union . London: Palgrave, 2015, p. 1. 98 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community. Official Journal L 149, p. 2-50. 99 Judgement of the Court (fifth chamber) 25 February 1999 Robin Swaddling v Adjudication Officer , C-90/97, p. 1099.