BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS / Šturma, Mozetic (eds)

It is sometimes argued that the commodification of the human body is intrinsically wrong: 27 this is, however, an argument of moral philosophy and not of the law, for which reason we will not further examine it in this paper. Perhaps the most apparent advantage of extra-commerciality of the body is the fact that it corresponds with the internationally recognized principle of human dignity and the principle of inviolability of the human person. Keeping the human body out of commerce represents a safe space for avoiding a possible violation of human rights. Moreover, the commercialization of the human body would inevitably presume a further distinction between human body and the human person. However, there is a deep natural connection between a person and their body: nobody can possibly sell one’s own body without selling oneself. 28 A person must be understood in the unity of their biological, psychological, and even social aspects. For this reason, the protection of personal rights seems to be a more suitable legal instrument for the protection of the human body. 29 From this point of view, the concept of self-ownership seems to be redundant and meaningless. 30 The understanding of the human body as a category sui generis also corresponds with the anthropocentric trend in modern legal systems of democratic societies which, to a certain extent, prefer the personal rights of the individual over the public interest. 31 A shortage of human body parts needed for medical use, therefore, cannot justify any violations of personal integrity, should they consist in physical violence or in subtle coercion including financial pressure. On the other hand, the rejection of self-ownership can be understood as contradicting the principle of autonomy, which undoubtedly forms one of the cornerstones of contemporary medical law and civil law in general. The complete ban on a legal disposition of one’s own body parts can therefore be considered a strongly paternalistic approach. 32,33 the public interest. See (in the Czech language) POLICAR, R.: Lidské tělo. In: Těšinová, J., Žďárek, R., Policar, R., Medicínské právo, Praha: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 184. 27 See JACKSON, E.: Medical Law. Text, Cases, and Materials. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 744. The arguments against commodification often include the fear of objectification of the human body, i.e. treating the body as a mere thing. See for example a critical analysis of this argument in GREASLEY, K.: Property Rights in the Human Body: Commodification and Objectification. In: Goold, I., Greasley, K., Herring, J., Skene, L. (eds.), Persons, Parts, and Property. How Should We Regulate Human Tissue in the 21 st Century? Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 67-87. 28 For a brief analysis of the person-body relation, see (in the Czech language) ŠUSTEK, P.: Právní status lidského těla a jeho částí. In: Šustek, P., Holčapek, T. (eds.), Zdravotnické právo, Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2016, p. 389-390. 29 Based on this assumption, it seems that human body parts should be considered material objects sui generis which are not subject to commerce or ownership. See (in the Czech language) POLICAR, R.: Lidské tělo. In: Těšinová, J., Žďárek, R., Policar, R., Medicínské právo, Praha: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 186. 30 See (in the Czech language) ŠUSTEK, P.: Právní status lidského těla a jeho částí. In: Šustek, P., Holčapek, T. (eds.), Zdravotnické právo, Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2016, p. 390. 31 This trend is also reflected in the CC. See ibid., p. 394. 32 See for example SAVULESCU, J.: Is the sale of body parts wrong? Journal of Medical Ethics, 2003, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 138-139. Also available at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138, accessed 12 December 2017. 33 For a more detailed introduction to the ongoing debate, see for example JACKSON, E.: Medical Law. Text, Cases, and Materials. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 744-748, or (with a certain

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