BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS / Šturma, Mozetic (eds)

5. Practical suitability of self-ownership It is usually not contested that a legal market for human organs and tissues would probably significantly help in solving the problem of organ shortage. 34 Not only would it motivate more people to consider providing their organs for transplantation, 35 but it would also encourage many potential donors who would like to give their organs but may be discouraged by the related costs (missed work hours, transportation and accommodation costs etc.). 36 However, the self-ownership might, in fact, help not only recipients but also donors. According to promoters of self-ownership, the human tissue market would widen the economic possibilities of poor people and therefore both support their autonomy and reduce poverty. 37 Furthermore, it is likely that the strategy to pay donors from the healthcare system funds would, at least in case of kidney donations, in effect lower the healthcare costs, 38 resulting in a better healthcare for everyone. Moreover, it can be argued that the regulated market for human organs would prevent many atrocities connected with the black market, 39 even though the experience from Iran shows that legality of organ sales does not eliminate illegal trade. 40 On the other hand, supporters of the status quo argue that a tissue market would actually limit the poor people’s choices since many organ sellers report they felt coerced or pressured to sell their body parts. 41 Therefore, their consent could not be considered valid, and the organ sale would be – to say the least – highly problematic not only from emphasis on English law) HERRING, J.: Medical Law and Ethics. 5 th edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 457-470. For a further understanding, see GOOLD, I., GREASLEY, K., HERRING, J., SKENE, L. (eds.): Persons, Parts, and Property. How Should We Regulate Human Tissue in the 21 st Century? Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2016. 34 See for example BRAZIER, M., CAVE, E.: Medicine, Patients and the Law. 6 th edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016, pp. 539-540. 35 See for example HERRING, J.: Medical Law and Ethics. 5 th edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 460. 36 For example, American bioethicist Arthur Caplan opposes the idea of an organ market but supports the organ donor compensation since the costs of donation may be very significant. CAPLAN, A. L.: Should We Pay Organ Donor Heroes? Medscape, 28 August 2017. https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/884101, accessed 11 December 2017. 37 See for example RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, J.: The Ethics of Transplants. Why Careless Thought Costs Lives. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 134 (but also throughout the whole book), HERRING, J.: Medical Law and Ethics. 5 th edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 459-460. 38 BARNIEH, L., GILL, J. S., KLARENBACH, S., MANNS, B. J.: The Cost-Effectiveness of Using Payment to Increase Living Donor Kidneys for Transplantation, Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology, 2013, Vol. 8, No. 12, pp. 2165-2173. Also available at: http://cjasn.asnjournals.org/content/ early/2013/10/23/CJN.03350313.full, accessed 12 December 2017. 39 See HERRING, J.: Medical Law and Ethics. 5 th edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 460. We will now leave aside the examples of involuntary organ harvesting executed by the state, such as the current practice in China. 40 See BENGALI, S., MOSTAGHIM, R.: ‘Kidney for sale’: Iran has a legal market for the organs, but the system doesn’t always work, Los Angeles Times, 15 October 2017. http://www.latimes.com/world/ middleeast/la-fg-iran-kidney-20171015-story.html, accessed 9 December 2017. 41 See for example KOPLIN, J.: Choice, pressure and markets in kidneys, Journal of Medical Ethics, 4 November 2017. http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2017/11/04/medethics-2017-104192, accessed 12 December 2017.

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