BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS / Šturma, Mozetic (eds)

Here, uncertainty takes the place of order; the actions of the public arenas instituted – and their results – contradict the intentions revealed by the original social pacts (and conveyed by the Constitution, infra-constitutional ordinances, budgetary laws, daily public management). State, to the point where it no longer recognizes it as the legitimate representative of its demands, caring little for what happens in terms of its official actions. For a long time the reaction of citizenship in the face of corruption – especially in Brazil – was of indifference, and not only of it, is that the public forces of repression of the State were also affected by discouragement related to the difficulties of finding corrupt acts, not only because they were very stealthy and protected by a large number of powerful stakeholders, but also because of the lack of up-to-date legal and administrative tools that could be more effective in dealing with these issues. 37 As Caiden recalls: Although it is done by the public interest and not by ill will, it was always considered degrading to denounce corruption and the complainants were victimized and attacked, which in fact still happens. There was very little reliable information outside the media, which were also careful not to offend established authorities that might deprive them of their access to official sources of information; in addition, they could be prosecuted for violating laws that had been expressly promulgated to protect institutions and public leaders from any criticism . 38 Even in academic and more scientific terms, it is important to note that the International Political Science Association formed a special committee on research on political corruption, launching in 1986 a periodical devoted specifically to the subject, which later became part of the prestigious Crime Magazine , Law and Social Change , where classic texts on corruption were published in the late 1980s, such as Heidenheimer (1989), Klitgaard (1988) and Noonan (1984). 39 That is, even from the perspective of reflective maturation of these questions, we can verify that very recently, more systematic studies related to them have surfaced in a more systematic way. 4. Conclusion All this literature has shown us, for example, that the illegal manipulation of international financial markets imposes varying types of vulnerabilities on weaker national economies, and their representative public institutions. Delinquent organizations and offenders 37 See the text of SANTIN, J. R.: State, Civil Society and Legitimation of Power. In Journal of Political Studies. Belo Horizonte, n. 111, pp. 247-274, jul./dez. 2015. 38 CAIDEN, G. E.: Democracy and Corruption. Op. cit., p. 5. Remember the author: The President of the Institutes of International Media Partners Inc. caused a stir by dedicating the September / October 1991 issue of his magazine, CEO / International Strategies to Corruption. The editorial stated: “Shady businesses and those who take advantage of them are more common than free market worship and seem to rule the world. Are there exceptions? Maybe. But the rules are made to break them. Look around … or read this number “ (p. 9) . 39 HEIDENHEIMER, A. J.: Political Corruption . New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1989; KLIT- GAARD, R.: Controlling Corruption . Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1988 and NOONAN Jr., J. T.: Bribes . New York: Macmillan, 1984. See also Crime, Law and Social Change magazine website : https://link.springer.com/journal/10611/67/2/page/1.

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