CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES AND TREATIES ON ARMS … their own existence were clearly the conditions for neither concluding armaments reduction treaties, nor, in the strict sense, disarmament contracts. The treaties on arms control and disarmament are specific in the sense of being the result of political considerations and the interests of states. Disarmament negotiations are based on strategic considerations. 3 In spite of the significant development of disarmament and arms control rules in recent decades, the doctrine of international law has no significant interest in this area. The issue of the disarmament is rarely included in textbooks and monographs on general international law. This is mainly due to the strong influence of international politics and inter-state relations on these standards. The overall political situation is more obvious in these rules than in other areas of international law. Č. Čepelka 4 notes in this sense that “all disarmament treaties and arms control treaties show some differences compared to the conventional international treaties .” While compliance with the latest treaties is mainly ensured by the sanction component of the rule, in the case of disarmament treaties or the treaties on arms control… “their duration depends rather on the factual circumstances of the nature of power ”. The specifics of the obligations stemming from the treaties on disarmament is based on their interdependence. 5 These obligations are necessarily dependent on their corresponding exercise by other parties. Treaties on disarmament are based on the assumption of the similar implementation by other contracting parties. The breach of these treaties by a contracting party automatically has effects and affect the interests of all other contracting parties 6 . Thus, in disarmament treaties, a fundamental breach of one of the parties causes a violation of the whole contractual arrangement. In case of a serious violation of the disarmament treaty or of the treaty on arms restriction, the withdrawal or at least the suspension of the disarmament obligations is entirely logical. On the other hand, if the contracting party does not do so, the infringer gains effective advantage. 7 In the case of a violation of disarmament and arms restrictions, there is no possibility of reciprocal countermeasures, as opposed to in the case of violations of other international law obligations. The derogation of the disarmament rule or the control of armament means its actual liquidation. 8 The doctrine uses the term non-negotiable mandatory rules, such as in the area of high seas and the universe, disarmament obligations, and potentially also environmental obligations. 9 Reciprocal countermeasures are not practically possible and there is a risk of non-proportionality for non-reciprocal measures. The way out of the impasse is to take measures that can prevent the unlawful conduct of the states participating in the treaty or that can prevent the infringement. 10 International treaties on disarmament and arms control thus often contain provisions on control . The purpose of the control is to verify 4 ČEPELKA, Č. Právní garantování oblastí bez jaderných a chemických zbraní ve střední Evropě. [Legal guarantee of nuclear and chemical weapons-free areas in Central Europe]. Praha: Sborník příspěvků k aktuálním otázkám mezinárodního práva a politiky III , 1989, p. 29. 5 CASSESE, A. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 201. 6 Ibid. 7 ČEPELKA, Č., ŠTURMA, P. Mezinárodní právo veřejné. [Public International Law]. 2. Vydání. Praha: C.H. Beck, 2018, p. 425. 3 ONDŘEJ, J., ŠTURMA, P., BÍLKOVÁ, V., JÍLEK, D. a kol. Mezinárodní humanitární právo . [International humanitarian law]. Praha: C.H. Beck, 2010, p. 16.

8 Ibid., s. 433. 9 Ibid., s. 433. 10 Ibid., s. 82.

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