CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

RAINER HOFMANN – CORNELIA KIRCHBACH CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ that the contracting states comply with the provisions of the contract. The control includes working upon the parties to implement the provisions of the agreement in compliance with the obligations assumed. One of the functions of control is, as stated in the UN study 11 of 1990, to avert the risk of non-compliance. In other words, to deter potential violators of the obligations. In this context, the so-called intrusive control measures, such as on-the-spot inspections, are particularly important. 12 As a rule, inspections are very detailed and apply to all facilities under the contract. The equipment to be inspected is notified in a very short time in advance. J. Malenovský 13 also states that the inspection activities help in the compliance of the international law. The international law of treaties is currently codified by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. It may be questioned, to what extent is the Vienna Convention applicable to contracts in the field of arms reduction and disarmament. This question arises mainly on the formal level . The Vienna Convention came into force in 1980, and as a contractual instrument, because of the prohibition of retroactivity, it cannot therefore apply to contracts previously concluded . Therefore, from a formal point of view, it could not be applied to treaties such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Treaty on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 or to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and to a number of other multilateral and bilateral treaties. It would be possible to apply the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention only if these treaties and conventions express the customary international law , i.e. as a customary norm. Given the particularities of arms control and disarmament treaties , the question sometimes arises, whether the rules of international law of treaties are applicable at all to such treaties and, if so, what are the differences in their treatment. These questions arise in connection with the process of concluding these contracts and also, in particular, with the termination of their validity. The problem associated with the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 was also raised in the ILA Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament Law 14 of 1998 in connection with the possibility of applying its Article 18 to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996. Article 18 imposes on States which have signed or have given their final consent to be bound by a treaty , not to do anything in contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. The discussion was also important because some states, such as the USA, signed the treaty, but do not intend to ratify it in the near future. The treaty cannot enter into force unless explicitly enumerated states, with the nuclear and military nuclear programs, ratify it, the USA is among those states. 2. Treaties on arms control and disarmament and the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 11 A/45/372, Verification in all its aspects: Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, 28 September 1990, p. 24. 12 ONDŘEJ, J. Úloha kontroly v procesu odzbrojení a regulace zbrojení. The Role of Verification in the Process of Disarmament and Arms Control. Právník , 1997, č. 7, pp. 579-580. 13 MALENOVSKÝ, J. Mezinárodní právo veřejné. Obecná část a poměr k jiným právním systémům . [Public International Law. General part and relation to other legal systems]. 6. Vydání. Brno: Doplněk, 2014, p. 241. 14 The International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Eighth Conference. Taipei, Taiwan, 1998, pp. 172-178.

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