CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ TEN YEARS AND ONE HUNDRED OF REVIEWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS … report on the case to the Sanctions Committee, including a concrete recommendation on delisting. In 2011, the Al-Qaida and the Taliban sanctions were split and the Ombudsperson’s services were assigned exclusively to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (IDAQ) sanctions. 2 Although this was only one of many changes in the counter-terrorism sanctions regime established in 1999 (others including e.g. the regular review of the sanctions list), for those whose names were included in the sanctions list this was the most significant developments over the time. It gave them a chance to request a review of the listing. In the last ten years, the fairness and clearness of the sanctions review have improved substantially thanks to the Ombudsperson. The originality and uniqueness of the institution attracted much attention of scholars. They have been thoroughly observing and analyzing the progressive development of its mandate, they compare its competence with other sanctions-reviewing mechanisms and judicial oversight, 3 wage the characteristic weakness of this non-permanent and quasi-judicial organ and the degree of independence the body has gained from States, 4 and debate proposals of States and academics for further advancement of the institution and the Ombudsperson system. This article aims to enrich the current academic discussion on the position and legal aspects of the operation of the Ombudsperson by presenting an overall assessment of the Ombudsperson’s activity as it can be seen by those who are seeking the delisting – the petitioners, and the users of the Ombudsperson system. It is based on the presumption that not only the Security Council and the Member States shape the role and define the contribution of the institution for international community, but also that the petitioners decide by their behavior about the meaning and the future of the organ. The fact that a person on the Sanctions list submits their request to the Ombudsperson Office always reflects their belief in the mechanism and externalizes their expectation connected with the review mechanism. The finding that 82 individuals and 30 entities have sent their request to the Ombudsperson already confirms that they perceive the institution as necessary. Regarding the fact that the IDAQ sanctions regime is the oldest and the sanctions list is very long, everything that proves meaningful and operational here may inspire other sanction regimes imposed at the UN level. In comparison with other case studies and overall studies focused on targeted sanctions that can offer detailed legal analysis of judgments or orders of national or European courts, the work with the Ombudsperson’s cases is different, less precise, more blurred. The documents related to cases (e.g., the request for delisting, the comprehensive report of the Ombudsperson, the reasoning of the Ombudsperson’s recommendation) are classified and not available to the public. The identity of a concerned individual or entity is made public at the moment of the delisting decision; otherwise (if the request was withdrawn or denied), the identity of the unsuccessful petitioner stays withheld. However, although we cannot work in 2 UNSC Res 1988 (17 June 2011) UNDoc S/RES/1988, UNSC Res 1989 (17 June 2011) UNDoc S/RES/1989. 3 RICHARDGORDON, MICHAEL SMYTH, andTOMCORNELL. Sanctions Law . Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019, pp. 138-142. ERIKA DE WET, ‘From Kadi to Nada: judicial techniques favouring human rights over United Nations Security Council sanctions’ (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 4, 787. 4 FRANCESCO GIUMELLI and FILIPPO COSTA BURANELLI, ‘When states and individuals meet: The UN Ombudsperson as a ‘contact point’ between international and world society’ International Relations (Article first published online: 11 July 2019) accessed 21 May 2019. KATALIN TÜNDE HUBER and ALEJANDRO RODILES, ‘An Ombudsperson in the United Nations Security Council: a Paradigm Shift?’ (2012) Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 107.

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