CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

ZUZANA TRÁVNÍČKOVÁ CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ depth with individual decisions, the entire caseload can provide us useful information about the behavior of petitioners. The dynamics of the caseload, the length of the proceeding, and the success rate of petitioners illustrate how attractive the Ombudsperson’s review is. Special attention will be devoted to two moments in the so-far existence of the Ombudsperson’s procedure and its possible impact on the caseload: the extension of the Ombudsperson’s competence in June 2011 and the vacancy of the Ombudsperson post between August 2017 and July 2018. Whereas the first moment positively strengthens the Ombudsperson system, the second one illustrates the fragility of the institution and, together with the temporary mandate 5 of the Ombudsperson, represents one of the future issues. With information about the date of the listing, which can be found in the Security Council press releases issued after the delisting, 6 we can analyze the length of time on the sanctions list. The annual reports of the Sanctions Committee, presented to the Security Council, feature information about the overall movement of individuals and entities on the sanctions list. The numbers of individuals and entities added and removed from the list enable us to assess how effective the process of review through the Ombudsperson system is compared to the regular review maintained by the Sanctions Committee and Member States delisting requests. II. IDAQ sanctions list All UN sanctions lists are maintained by respective sanctions committees, created at the moment when the sanctions regime is introduced by a Security Council Resolution. The mandate of sanctions committees slightly varies as well as the goals of restrictive measures and their scope differ. In common, all sanctions committees are mandated to oversee the implementation of the restrictive measures, decide on exemptions from the sanctions, communicate with the UN Member States, report to the Security Council, and especially maintain sanctions list. They add/remove names of individuals and entities who are/are no longer meeting the listing criteria, as defined in the UN Security Council resolutions. 7 Only the IDAQ and the 1988 (Taliban) Sanctions Committee are by the mandate of their sanctions lists assisted by a specialized expert group - the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. The Monitoring team was set up in 2004, it operates under the direction of the sanction committees, and currently consists of ten experts. Its mandate is defined in Security Council resolution 2368 (2017), which includes, among others, the submission of reports to the Committee - every six months - on the implementation of sanctions, assisting the Ombudsperson in carrying out their mandate, including by providing updated information on those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking their removal from 5 So far, the Ombudsperson works on a non-permanent basis and their mandate must be extended periodically. In June 2017 the mandate was extended until December 2021. UNSC 2368 (20 July 2017), UN Doc 2368 (2017), par. 60. 6 I.e. only when the Ombudsperson recommends, and the Sanctions Commission does not oppose the delisting. 7 The listing criteria currently contained in UNSC resolution 2368 (2017) contain: “ (a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; (b) Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; (c) Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof”. UNSC Res 2368 (20 July 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2368, art. 2.

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