CYIL vol. 12 (2021)

CYIL 12 (2021) THE 50 TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION… of the post-World War II era, has the same widely accepted objective to control nuclear material, preventing its diversion to illicit purposes or clandestine operations. Article XII of the Statute allows the IAEA to conclude Agreements between the Agency and States to promote cooperation in implementing the regime of nuclear material control. On the other hand, States must internally establish different processes and procedures, as necessary, to fulfil the safeguard obligations. Indeed, in practice, arrangements vary according to differences in the size and complexity of nuclear programs and national regulatory infrastructures. 14 Although the Agency Safeguard System was established before the NPT entered into force, today the NPT and the Agency are intimately linked. 15 To implement Article III of the NPT, States must implement IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols 16 to establish and list the nuclear material and facilities subject to verification by IAEA inspectors. The purpose of these safeguards is to verify that declared (usually traded) nuclear material remains within the civilian nuclear fuel cycle and that its application remains for peaceful purposes. The information is updated by states on a quarterly basis, which requires operators of nuclear facilities to keep up-to-date records and inventories, and to include in detail all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Yukiya Amano, the former Director General of the IAEA, in an 2 April, 2019 speech at the sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference stated that the IAEA implements a safeguards regime in 182 countries, 179 of which are Contracting Parties to the NPT. He further noted that the Additional Protocol , which extends verification and gives IAEA inspectors access to more facilities, needs to be implemented by all NPT States Parties, an action that is not yet fully complete. He further asserted that the safeguards system is fundamental to ensuring confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear weapons and securing international credibility in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. 17 The Additional Protocol is considered by Joseph F. Pilat to be an important tool that requires “ universal acceptance as the standard for safeguards and a condition for exports .” 18 In fact, the Additional Protocol has the advantage that provided a window for the Agency to have a broad knowledge of the nuclear program, which simultaneously allowed access to more facilities beyond those declared nuclear facilities. 19 The State-Level Concept is another initiative based on the advantages of the Additional Protocol. 20 Nevertheless, this could all be at risk in a world without NPT. 14 Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure , Service Series 31, IAEA, Vienna (2018) 1. 15 PILAT, Joseph F. A World without the NPT redux, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 5 (available at: https://unidir. org/publication/world-without-npt-redux). 16 See: https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol. 17 See: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/strengthening-the-non-proliferation-treaty-ahead-of-the-review- conference-in-2020. 18 Pilat (fn 15) 6. 19 Idem, ibidem. 20 See: Laura Rockwood approach at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-08/iaea%E2%80%99s-state-level- concept-law-unintended-consequences.

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