CYIL vol. 12 (2021)

maria manuel meruje

CYIL 12 (2021)

3. Nuclear weapons and the Deterrence Doctrine

3.1 The theory of deterrence by Thomas C. Schelling The Second World War ended with the surrender of Japan. At that time there were no Treaties or Conventions in force regarding proliferation of nuclear weapons or disarmament. The Cold War period began and lasted until 1991 with the official dissolution of the USSR. This period is generally characterized by the absence of armed conflict between the two superpowers, Russia, the US and their allies. Yet it heralded the instigation by these powers of geographically limited wars known as “proxy wars”. 21 During the Cold War period, Russia initiated a nuclear weapons development program and tested a nuclear weapon for the first time in 1949. 22 This rapid advance in the construction of nuclear weapons, and the consequent increase in Russia’s nuclear arsenal, changed the stability of the nuclear balance. Such was the famous “ balance of terror ” first presented to the public by Albert Wohlstetter in 1953 but made famous by Winston Churchill. 23 After 1949 the fear of a possible nuclear war achieved prominence, given the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against vulnerable positions, particularly in Western Europe. But would it be plausible to adopt a strategy that would result in mass destruction? 24 AnalyzingThomas C. Schelling’s “ Arms and Influence ” is inevitable, given the presentation of the military doctrine most relevant to the discussion of the use of nuclear weapons – “DeterrenceTheory”. 25 Schelling explores the concept of “deterrence”, relating it to bargaining power or negotiating power. His understanding posits that the bargaining power of a state consists of its ability, through the power to inflict greater or lesser damage, to achieve an advantage. In this sense, its application transpires in concepts such as ‘deterrence’, ‘retaliation’ or ‘reprisal’, ‘terrorism’, ‘war’, ‘armistice’ and ‘surrender’, as well as reciprocal efforts to contain offences in the treatment of prisoners, the limitation of war and the regulation of armaments. Military threat can be used not only to achieve an objective by coercion, but also to represent an influence of one country over another by the potential damage it might cause. 26 For Schelling, this bargaining power represents a kind of diplomacy, but he does not consider it a traditional military strategy, whose art or science of victory is fundamental. The same author presents, in parallel, the differences between the use of force and coercion, explaining it as follows: the action of taking from someone what you want differs from the action of making someone give that same thing; the action of preventing an assault is different from the action of making someone fear an assault . This will be the distinction between ‘defense’ and ‘deterrence’, or ‘use of force’ and ‘intimidation’, or ‘action’ and ‘threat’. It will also be the distinction between a unilateral or non-diplomatic recourse and a coercive diplomacy based on the power to cause a third-party harm or damage. 27 21 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_proxy_wars#Cold_War_proxy_wars. 22 See: https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today/. 23 WOHLSTETTER, Albert. The Delicate Balance of Terror , Foreign Affairs (1959). 24 ROWEN, Henry S. Introduction: Getting MAD Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice , Strategic Studies Institute (2004), pp. 1–12. 25 Schelling (fn 5), pp. 1–34.

26 Idem, ibidem. 27 Idem, ibidem.

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