CYIL vol. 12 (2021)

CYIL 12 (2021) THE 50 TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION… In Schelling’s view, ‘deterrence’ seems to relate to the influence it can exert on the adversary’s decision and risk assessment, requiring an understanding of the enemy’s potential priorities, perceptions and strategies. However, as he points out, wars until the Second World War were generally won by force rather than by intimidation. This scenario changed with the detonation of nuclear weapons in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagazaki. As he states, the US won in a military sense by destroying two cities, but from a civilian perspective Japan lost much more. The nuclear bombs did not represent an attack on two cities, but an attack on Japan. The effects of the detonation of the nuclear bombs had not only a military purpose of destruction but in themselves added pain, shock and medium-long term effects. As Schelling reaffirms, Mankind, for the first time in history had sufficient military power to eliminate his own species and used weapons for which there was, at the time, no possible defense. For Schelling, the destruction inflicted by the USA on Japanese territory could have been achieved by other types of bombs, but he recognizes that would have taken longer to achieve similar effects and that during such an attack there would have been time for Japan to organize a retaliation. 28 One example of the deterrence doctrine is the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. 29 From Schelling’s point of view it would be difficult for anyone to admit that there was a willingness between the two superpowers to start a nuclear war. The Cuban crisis is usually given as a positive example of the outcome of the ‘deterrence’ theory by its advocates. As Schelling confirms, “deterrence” must be understood in this relationship of uncertainty. The main question is: is there any probability that the US will take an action that carries the danger of war? Something that could lead – through a comparison of actions and reactions, calculations and miscalculations, alarms and false alarms, compromises and challenges – to a nuclear war? 30 This is the reason why the theory of “deterrence” is consistent for Schelling. If a war tends to result from a dynamic escalation in which both parties are increasingly involved, it will not be just the first attack, even a credible one, that will lead to a nuclear war. In the present context, it is necessary to not only address the issues concerning the superpowers, but also the smaller nuclear powers that could lead to the deterrence doctrine failure, being an imperfect model to existent geopolitical environment. 31 3.2 The MAD Doctrine The policy of massive retaliation was formally replaced in September 1967, when US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara acknowledged that Russia’s nuclear bomb arsenal was reaching parity with the US arsenal, creating a situation of “ assured destruction ”, to which Donald Brennen added the word “ mutual ” to form the acronym – MAD – “mutual assured destruction”, henceforth the MAD Doctrine. The MAD Doctrine was not well accepted by the US military, whose military strategy was “deterrence”. 32

28 Idem, ibidem. 29 On this topic see: Mark Fitzpatrick e Marc Barnett, Risk and Nuclear Deterrence , Chapter II, UNIDIR 2017, 24 and ss. (available at: https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/understanding-nuclear-weapon-risks- en-676.pdf ).

30 Schelling (fn 5) 97. 31 Fitzpatrick (fn 29). 32 SIRACUSA, Joseph M. Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2008), s. 69.

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