CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

JAN MAIS

CYIL 14 ȍ2023Ȏ

1. Factual context During an armed conflict, an NPP can be damaged in several ways. Apart from a supposable scenario of a missile hitting safety-critical reactor equipment, equally dangerous can be the disabling of electricity or water supply. Such an outage, already experienced in Fukushima NPP in 2011, can lead to disruption of the cooling mechanism, without which the nuclear reactor could subsequently overheat, leading to its meltdown and potential release of radioactive material over a wide geographical area. 5 Unlike the Chornobyl disaster, today’s nuclear reactors are safer in design and protected by robust containment structures with safety mechanisms ensuring that the core remains cool even if some systems are destroyed. 6 These safeguards, however, are not primarily intended to protect from the impacts of war and do not shield all the electricity and water supply systems. Therefore, the potential gravity of the situation cannot be relativized. Even though there have been some incidents connected with attacks on nuclear facilities in past, the targeted objects were primarily research facilities, with the argument behind these strikes being deterrence from creating nuclear weapons. 7 Though controversial, these actions never involved a functioning NPP operating for peaceful purposes. The Russian attack on Zaporizhzhia and its subsequent occupation, thus, represents a regrettable milestone in the conduct of warfare. Only a few days into the invasion, the Russian forces began surrounding Europe’s largest NPP that, before the war, generated electricity for more than 20 per cent of the whole Ukraine. On the night from 3 rd to 4 th March 2022, Russian troops made an advance on the Zaporizhzhia NPP, and after the clash with the Ukrainian defence, the six-reactor-large facility has come fully under Russian control. 8 In the course of the attack, Russian forces shelled and damaged the administrative building and training centre directly attached to the facility, setting the latter on fire. The security footage revealed that some strikes were aimed deep into the complex, and a landed shell was located about 75 meters from one of the reactor buildings. 9 Later, after the takeover, Russia established a military base within the complex, serving as an artillery post which, thanks to the strategic location of NPP, enables shelling of territory under Ukrainian control on the opposite shore of the Dnipro River. 10 After lengthy negotiations, Russia agreed to an IAEA inspection, which started on 1 st September 2022. The agency concluded that all seven pillars of nuclear safety had been violated and founded an observer mission at the site, though the rotation of its members 5 See DUMÉ, I., ‘What are the risks of nuclear power plants in wartime?’ ( Polytechnique insights , 12 July 2022) accessed 30 May 2023. 6 Ibid. 7 See CARLSON, J., ‘Prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities’ ( Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation , 12 September 2022) 1 accessed 30 May 2023. 8 See BRUMFIEL, G., and others, ‘Video analysis reveals Russian attack on Ukrainian nuclear plant veered near disaster’ ( National Public Radio , 11 March 2022) accessed 30 May 2023. 9 Ibid. 10 See HINSHAW, D. and PARKINSON, J., ‘Russian Army Turns Ukraine’s Largest Nuclear Plant Into a Military Base’ ( The Wall Street Journal , 5 July 2022) accessed 30 May 2023.

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