CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

CYIL 14 (2023) PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT remains problematic. 11 In the same month, Zaporizhzhia’s reactors were put to ‘cold shutdown’ — a process which stops the fission reaction and significantly reduces both the risk of core damage and the amount of radioactivity present in the reactors that could be released in the event of an accident. 12 Over the winter, two reactors went into a less stable ‘hot shutdown’ in order to produce power for the operation of the facility, with one remaining in this mode until now. 13 Still, even if all reactors are in cold shutdown, they require to be cooled, and consequently, the facility needs off-site power to keep the cooling systems running. However, in the context of the armed conflict, the supply of off-site power is heavily limited. Despite IAEA’s presence, the complex has been repeatedly shelled, with both parties blaming the other for these actions. 14 On seven occasions, the supply had been cut off completely, forcing the NPP to rely only upon its emergency diesel generators. 15 The so-call ‘island mode’ of an NPP is the last line of defence as in case of its failure, the reactors would be lacking the needed cooling, which could lead to disastrous consequences. At the time of writing this article, in May 2023, the Zaporizhzhia NPP remains under Russian occupation. 16 2. Applicable IHL rules Turning to the applicable rules, the regime protecting NPP during armed conflict is complex, but as will be shown, complex does not necessarily mean comprehensive. The central piece of the regulation is enshrined in a special rule concerning the ‘Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces’ that can be found in Art 56 API. 17 However, Art 56 API constitutes only one of the layers of protection granted to NPPs. 18 Indispensable is also 12 See MESHKATI, N., ‘Cold shutdown reduces risk of disaster at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant – but combat around spent fuel still poses a threat’ ( The Conversation , 13 September 2022) accessed 30 May 2023; ASZÓDI, A., ‘A nuclear safety expert’s view on the crisis at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant’ ( Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 2 September 2022) accessed 30 May 2023. 13 See IAEA ‘Update 154 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine’ (21 April 2023) Press Release. 14 See UNSC ‘United Nations ‘Gravely Concerned’ by Situation at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, Political Affairs Chief Tells Security Council’ (23 August 2022) Press Release SC/15003. 15 See IAEA, ‘Update 159 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine’ (22 May 2023) Press Release. 16 It is worth mentioning that the Zaporizhzhia facility has not been the only NPP that faced Russian military operations, as for some time Russian troops captured the decommissioned Chernobyl NPP. Unlike Zaporizhzhia, there was no reported fighting at the NPP as the staff operating the facility negotiated their surrender. Ultimately, after the failure to conquer Kyiv, the Russian troops withdrew from the area on 1 April 2020. 17 Art 56 API. The rule is to a certain degree also reflected in customary international law. See ICRC, ‘Rule 42. Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces’ ( International Humanitarian Law Databases ) accessed 30 May 2023. 18 International Committee of the Red Cross Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, 1974–1977) (‘Diplomatic Conference’) Volume XV CDDH/215/Rev.1, 282 para 86. 11 See IAEA, ‘Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine: 2nd Summary Report by the Director General’ (5 September 2022) paras 165–167; IAEA ‘Update 152 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine’ (30 March 2023) Press Release.

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