CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

PETRA RUFFER LUSTIGOVÁ

CYIL 14 (2023)

5. Conclusion When adopting a resolution, the Security Council is not anyhow restricted by the letter of the UN Charter, as long as the said resolution is properly adopted in accordance with the required rules of procedures. The Security Council, when adopting measures under Chapter VII necessary for the prevention or removal of threats to the peace, or measures to suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, can ignore not only the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter, but also principles of justice in Article 1(1), as they must be observed only in reference to adjustment or settlement of international disputes. As the main role of the UN Security Council is the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and as such is not further defined or specified in the Charter, it is difficult to encompass all the possible legal implications and to imagine a Council’s action that would go out of this scope. Therefore, the Security Council’s power and authority are almost non-restricted by the UN Charter, with the exception of breach of procedural rules and thus “ nothing in the Charter explicitly binds the Security Council to meet any general requirements of international law and that in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council is particularly free to act ”. 98 Concluding on the limits posed by the general international law, it has been maintained that the Security Council is not restricted by any norm, since its decisions enjoy the supremacy over any other international agreement and obligations arising from binding resolutions of the Security Council prevail over any other obligations. A Security Council’s resolution can equally override the international customary law. So, does the end justify the means? Not really, since there seems to emerge one exception given the special status of norms of ius cogens. Although they have been developing only in the past decades and their status is not yet fully anchored in the international law, they strongly indicate that nemo est supra legis .

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98 O’Connell, supra note 1 , pp. 56–57.