CYIL vol. 8 (2017)

CYIL 8 ȍ2017Ȏ RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL … in a uniform manner to all those subjects whose actions entail international responsibility, taking into account their different status and the fact that they are not the legal subjects in the classical meaning of international law. The first part provides a short introduction into the question of legal personality in international law. I attempt to demonstrate how international law in its current state (focused on inter-state relations) is not compatible with surrounding backgrounds. The second part is focused on the responsibility of states, taking into account also non-state entities and their eventual international responsibility and state responsibility for the actions of its military systems. The third part deals with the responsibility of the individual with special attention paid to the context of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. Finally certain conclusions are drawn referring to problems with attribution of international responsibility. Legal personality v. international responsibility Being a subject of international law, or having an international legal personality means to have certain rights or duties in international law within that legal system and being able to exercise those rights and duties (by for example bringing the claims or being subjected to international claims). 7 Historically, only states were perceived as legal persons in international relations. This means that states were originally regarded as the primary addressees of rights and obligations in international law. This field has been developing very slowly – currently states are still the primary subjects of international law – today’s international law is state- centered, and state-oriented. Departure from the exclusively state-centered model of the international legal system resulted in the widening of the group of entities labeled as international law subjects, but only after WWII have some new subjects emerged and now could be definitely classified as being international law subjects. This refers specifically to the personality of international organizations, 8 belligerents or individuals. 9 It is worth noting that only several decades ago many scholars doubted the legal personality of individual 10 , and still it is true that mostly the individual benefits indirectly from international law, and there are only a few areas of international law, like human rights or international criminal law, where the legal personality of the individual is confirmed and recognized. Thus international legal personality is no longer reserved only for states, but at the same time it cannot be generalized that all the subjects have the same rights, duties or powers and 7 CRAWFORD, J., Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law , Oxford University Press 2012, p. 116; R. Higgins, Conceptual thinking about the Individual in International Law, in: Themes and Theories , Oxford University Press 2009, p. 73. 8 Confirmed by the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the case of Reparations, where the Court stated: “The Organization is an international person. That is not the same thing as saying that it is a state, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a state”, see: Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations , Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174, see 179. 9 It is still discussed whether other entities could be called subjects of international law. See for example CRAWFORD, J., Brownlie’s Principles …, p. 120 et seq. Discussing the status of corporations Merja Pentikäinen points out that international human rights obligations can equally fall on states, individuals and other non-state actors, including corporations. See: Changing International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations under International Law- Status of Corporations, 2012 (8) Utrecht Law Review , January, p. 148. 10 See for example: CRAWFORD, J., Brownlie’s Principles … p. 121; ANZILOTTI, D., Cours de Droit International, Sirey, Paris 1929, p. 134, but see critically about the doctrine that only states are the subjects of international law KELSEN, H., Principles of International Law , The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1952, p. 114 et seq. 1.

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